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PREFACE 
This appeal is taken in only one of the three cases 
which were consolidated for trial, No. 224,441, Lignell and 
Todd v. Berg Construction Co. and Fidelity and Deposit. In 
this brief the parties are identified as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are E. Keith Lignell and Burton M. 
Todd and their wives, and are sometimes called "Lignell and 
Todd," or the "owners." 
2. Defendants are Clifford M. Berg and William R. 
Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company, 
and Frank C. Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a 
Berg Construction Company (sometimes called "contractor" or 
the "joint venture"), and Fidelity and Deposit Company of 
Maryland (sometimes called the "bonding company" or "surety"). 
Reference is sometimes made to Clifford M. Berg and to Clif-
ford M. Berg and William R. Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg 
Brothers Construction Company which is referred to as "Berg 
Brothers" or the "partnership." Though neither the individual 
nor the partnership is a defendant, as such, their positions 
as joint venturers require frequent reference to them. 
Parties to the cases consolidated with the instant 
case are: 
1. Hendrik Copinga and Brent Greenwood, d/b/a Western 
Drywall, a partnership (sometimes called "drywaller" or 
"Western"). 
-i-
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2. Claron Bailey, called "Bailey." 
3. Comstock Electric of Utah, Inc., called 
"Comstock." 
4. Murray Electrical Services, Inc., called 
"Murray." 
The reporter's transcript is referred to herein 
as "T. " The Clerk's records have been designated 
by him as "A," "B," "C" and "D" and are referred to as 
"R. A " or R. c __ ," etc., in this brief. 
Unless otherwise indicated all statutory reference: 
are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
-ii-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H. 
LIGNELL, his wife, BURTON M. 
TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD, 
his wife, 
v. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
CLIFFORD M. BERG and WILLIAM 
R. BERG, a partnership, d/b/a 
BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, and FRANK C. BERG, 
an individual, a joint 
venture, d/b/a BERG CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, and FIDELITY 
AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, 
a corporation, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 15001 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On October 9, 1973, the drywall subcontractor, 
Western Drywall, commenced suit in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, No. 214954, against Berg Brothers Construction 
for breach of its subcontract agreement and against Fidelity 
and Deposit Company of Maryland on the labor and material 
bond provided by it relating to the Incline Terrace Apart-
ments, Salt Lake City, Utah. The drywallers also sought to 
foreclose a mechanics lien on the premises and, in addition 
thereto, claimed a direct cause of action against the owners, 
Lignell and Todd. A materialman, Claron Bailey, later joined 
-1-
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., 
that suit as a third-party Plaintiff and alleged a mechanic 
lien against the property, a direct cause of action against 
the surety, a direct cause of action against Lignell per~ 
ally and against both Lignell and Todd. On September 23, 
1974, Murray Electric commenced suit against Berg Brothers 
Construction Company, No. 222531, alleging $21,360.00 due' 
breach of contract, and against the surety on the labor ~~ 
material bond (R. 02-6). In August of 1975 that complaint 
amended to include some seven causes of action directly ag< 
Lignell and Todd. In addition, the amended complaint addec 
Comstock as a party Plaintiff, alleged several alternate 
theories of recovery against the surety and recognized ~e 
JOint venture, Berg Construction Company, as the proper De· 
fendant (R. C276-302). That complaint was amended a seconi 
time on April 20, 1976 (R. C593-610). 
In December of 1974 Lignell and Todd brought suit, 
224,441, against the joint venture for a refund or return 
monies which Lignell and Todd claimed had been paid in exc' 
any sums due under the construction contract, and against· 
bonding company as the obligee on its performance bond. 
January of 1975 all cases were consolidated for trial u~n 
motion of the partnership (R. C252-254). Thereafter, Clif 
M. Berg and William R. Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construct 
Company, filed a counterclaim to the action of Lignell ~d 
Todd. 
-2-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial was had on the issues commencing on August 
14, 1976, and concluding on October 1, 1976. All claims of 
the drywallers, the materialmen and the electricians dir-
ectly against Lignell and Todd were either dismissed or 
disposed of by a verdict of no cause of action. The dry-
wallers and materialmen obtained a judgment against the 
partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Company, and the 
bonding company in the sum of $42,653.68. Murray Electric 
received a judgment against the partnership and the bonding 
company in the sum of $61,693.01. Clifford Berg and William 
Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company (the partner-
ship) obtained a judgment over against Lignell and Todd 
for the sums awarded to the electrician and the drywaller 
plus an additional $54,801.99 for a total judgment of 
$159,148.68. 
On November 30, 1976, the trial court allowed the 
imposition of interest on the judgment against Lignell and 
Todd in the sum of $25,535.55 and, in addition thereto, 
awarded attorney's fees on behalf of the partnership and 
the bonding company against Lignell and Todd in the sum of 
$21,000.00 each, and passed through to Lignell and Todd 
the attorney's fees that were awarded to the subcontractors 
in the sums of $11,000.00 and $21,000.00 respectively, for 
a total award of attorney's fees amounting to $74,000.00 
(R. Cl395-1397, 1409-1417). 
-3-
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RELIEF SOUGHT mJ APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs ask this Court to reverse the jud~, 
of the trial court or in the alternative to grant Plaintiff 
a trial in their case only. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February of 1971 E. Keith Lignell and Burton 
M. Todd began investigating the possibility of constructir. 
an apartment complex on the corner of 4th South and lOth 
East in Salt Lake City, Utah. As originally envisioned, 
the complex would contain 125 units located in three build· 
ings (designated "A," "B," and "C"). In February of that 
year they commenced discussions with Clifford M. Berg 
regarding the construction of the complex (T. 1231). 
Lignell and Todd had dealt with Berg previously on the 
construction of another apartment house in the area. They 
also, at that time, commenced negotiations with several 
lending institutions to finance the construction of the 
project. Lignell and Todd further proceeded to have pl~s 
and specifications for the project prepared by an architec: 
Ronald Molen. Preliminary plans were generated and sub-
mitted to the lending institution for its approval. By 
September 15, 1971, a detailed set of plans and specifica· 
tions was completed and given to Berg. Mr. Berg thereafte: 
transmitted the plans to the Salt Lake City Building 
Department to obtain a building permit. The plans were 
reviewed by Mr. Virgil Dick who indicated on the plans in 
red marking that they were deficient in certain areas (T. 
-4-
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976-980). On or about October 20, 1971, Berg met with 
representatives of the Salt Lake City Building Department, 
including Mr. Dick, discussed the plans with them and 
received back one set of plans with the notations and 
markings of the Department on them (T. 1009, 1018, 2675). 
Mr. Berg obtained a footing and foundation permit for the 
project from the City on October 22, 1971. 
Prior to the time the contract was signed Berg 
had presented to Lignell and Todd a detailed itemization 
of the bid (T. 1238, 2677, Ex's. 127, 139). After dis-
cussing the required changes with the City, he reviewed 
the figures several times and determined that no change 
would be made in the bid (T. 1019, 2678). Thereafter, on 
November 16, 1971, Clifford Berg entered into a contract 
with Lignell and Todd for the construction of the Incline 
Terrace Apartment project. The completion date for the 
entire project was November 16, 1972, but Berg agreed to 
construct the buildings sequentially so that Lignell and 
Todd could commence renting them. The C building was to 
be completed first, then B, then A (T. 1172-1173, 1263-1264). 
The agreed price for constructing the project was 
$1,455,000.00; excluded from the contract were certain 
items, including the demolition, carpets, drapes, land-
scaping, excavation in excess of $30,000.00, swimming pool 
and patio which Lignell and Todd agreed to have done 
themselves. The parties also agreed that the funds would 
be disbursed by Lignell upon the receipt of a draw request 
-5-
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from Clifford Berg (T. 1179-1181, 1206, 1250-1251). 
During the same time that Berg was negotiating 
with the owners, he was also attempting to procure the 
necessary bonding capacity from Fidelity and Deposit com-
pany of Maryland. Berg, by himself, was not able to 
obtain a bond of the size required, therefore, he ap-
proached his older brother, Frank, and promised him $7,500, 
from the profits on the job if he would go in with him on 
the bond (T. 1067). Frank Berg agreed to do this. Willi~ 
Berg and Clifford Berg had signed a bond application re-
lating to the project on July 27, 1971 (Ex. 256). Frank 
Berg signed an application for the bond on November 24, 
1971, whereon the applicant was identified as Berg Construe 
tion Company, the joint venture (Ex. 255). 
Mr. Berg did not start the actual work on the 
project until some time in February, 1972 (T. 664). At 
about that time the original contract was changed, on the 
insistence of the bonding company, to include as parties 
not only Lignell and Todd but also their wives, who were 
also owners of the property. In addition, the contracting 
entity was changed from Clifford M. Berg to "Clifford M. 
Berg and William R. Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction 
Company, and Frank c. Berg, an individual, a joint venture 
d/b/a Berg Construction Company" (T. 2146-2147, Ex. 9) • 
Various subcontracts relating to the project were also 
changed to reflect the fact that the joint venture was we 
party constructing the project (Ex. 20). Clifford Berg 
-6-
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was in charge of the project for the joint venture and was 
authorized to bind the joint venture, all participants 
thereon and all rnembersthereof (Ex. 164). Lignell was 
authorized to act on behalf of the four owners and vir-
tually all of the problems in the process of construction 
were handled by Berg and Lignell in their representative 
capacities. 
One of the original bidders, the electrician, 
could not meet the requirements for participating in a 
bonded project. Thereafter, Mr. Berg contacted Mr. Wilford 
Comstock of Comstock Electric and asked him to participate 
in the project in his place. Comstock's original bid was 
for $171,000.00. Berg, however, had only allowed $117,000.00 
for the electrician in the bid to the owners~ therefore, 
that bid was rejected as being too high. Thereafter, Berg 
and Comstock negotiated the price of the electrical bid 
down to $107,000.00 which was accepted (T. 311-312). 
Construction was disorganized and proceeded slowly 
(T. 1271, 2185). The contractor was unsure of its ability 
to construct a project of that size (T. 1268-1270). It 
had no bookkeeper for the project and no superintendent 
(T. 2235). until later in 1973 no telephone was installed 
on the project which required Berg to travel several blocks 
to the Arctic Circle to phone the subcontractors and sup-
plier> (T. 1871). Later on, Berg asked Mrs. Schoppe, the 
apartment manager, to contact the subcontractors for him 
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(T. 2185, 2210). There was no scheduling of the subcontr~ 
tors and a great deal of confusion on the job (T. 1870, 
2184-2185). Subcontractors and others complained about 
the quality of the work but nothing was done (T. 163, 
1876-1879, 2191-2192, 2210). 
In September of 1972 Lignell and Todd decided to 
add an extra floor to the B and A buildings and increase 
the number of units from 125 to 147. This was to be ac-
complished by adding 10 units on the new floor in the 
B building, 8 units on one new floor in the A building ~d 
adding four units in other portions of the buildings, one 
in C, two in B and one in A (T. 1253) • Lignell and Berg 
engaged in negotiations concerning this modification of 
the plans. At Lignell's request Berg provided several 
documents setting forth th~ price of the added units 
units and the amount of extras to the contract (Ex's. 105, 
128, 129). In April of 1973 Lignell and Berg executed~ 
Addendum to the contract with the joint venture covering 
the additional 22 units, plus extras and extending the 
completion date to July 15, 1973 (T. 1272, Ex. 11). All 
parties agreed that after that document was executed, the 
contract price amounted to $1,759,003.00. 
Mr. Berg commenced to make construction draws in 
April of 1972; Lignell and Todd prepared checks for the 
subcontractors and materialmen based thereon. Berg 
continued to make draw requests until October of that 
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year. During the months of October, November, December of 
1972 and January of 1973 Berg made no draws. 
In the fall of 1972 the project was refinanced to 
include the addition of the extra floors and the expansion 
of the number of units in the complex. The new construction 
financing was to terminate on November 1, 1973 (T. 1283). 
In addition, Lignell and Todd sold the ground upon which 
the project was being built for some $250,000.00 and then 
leased it back with a limited option to purchase. 
Mr. Berg recommenced making construction draws in 
February of 1973 and continued to do so Qntil the fall of 
that year. At trial Mr. Berg contended that payments had 
not been timely made by Lignell; however, Berg's expert, 
Mr. Mark Hatch, acknowledged that the payments by Lignell 
were made, in the most part, prcw-.ptly upon receipt of the 
required draw requests.l (T. 3158-3172). 
1972 was a time of high building activity in the 
valley. The original sheetrocker, Harry Nichols, did not 
maintain an adequate crew on the job. In September or 
October of that year Lignell insisted that Berg fire him. 
At the time that Mr. Nichols was dismissed he had completed 
the drywalling on just 32 units, although the completion 
date for the entire project was only two months away (T. 
lsome of the subcontractors also claimed that 
they were not paid timely, howeve:, a revie~ of the draw 
requests by Berg to Lignell relat1ng to the1r accounts 
again revealed that, in the most part, all sums requested 
by Berg were paid promptly within a few days (T. 1990-
1993, 2870-2878). 
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2756-2747; Ex. 226). Thereafter, Lignell contacted an 
acquaintance of his, Hendrik Copinga, and requested that 
he come up to the project and discuss the drywall matter 
with Mr. Berg. Mr. Copinga did this and ultimately he 
and his partner, Brent Greenwood, d/b/a Western Drywall, 
became engaged in the remainder of the drywall application 
on the Incline Terrace Apartments. 
In January of 197 3 Comstock Electric was experienc: 
financial difficulties; therefore, it left the project ~d 
was replaced by Murray Electrical Services, Inc., a non-
union electrical contractor owned by Mrs. Joyce Comstock, 
the wife of Wilford Comstock. Mr. Comstock served as the 
master electrician for both Comstock and Murray. 
The work did not proceed in an orderly fashion 
from the start and Lignell, or his representative, found 
that it was necessary for them to assume a more active 
role in the construction of the project in an effort to 
get it completed on time. By July of 1973, the date the 
entire project was to be completed, there remained much to 
be done. Lignell was concerned that the project would not 
be completed before the long-term loan commitment expired. 
In addition, it had been anticipated by Lignell and Todd 
that the project would be completed far enough in advance 
of the expiration of the permanent financing takeout that 
the project could achieve a substantial occupancy rate 
which was required by the permanent lender (T. 3301-3302). 
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In the fall of 1973 Berg became involved with 
several other projects and was frequently absent from the 
Incline Terrace, thus delaying the completion of the proj-
ect and increasing the possibility that the owner's permanent 
financing would be lost (T. 1870-1871). Lignell made written 
demands upon the contractor informing it that it was in 
default under the terms of the contract and demanding 
that the project be completed immediately (Ex's. 87, 88). 
At the same time, Lignell was working with the insurance 
company to receive an extension of the final takeout com-
mitment date, which he was ultimately able to do. 
In October of 1973 Lignell demanded that Berg 
terminate the electrician, Murray Electrical Services, 
Inc., because it was not diligently prosecuting the work 
and was delaying the completion of the buildings. Mr. 
Berg, who was aware that the owners' financing was in jeo-
pardy, was also concerned about the progress the electrician 
was making (T. 688, 690). Berg terminated Murray and 
thereafter contacted Mr. Lynn Bateman of Bateman Electric 
and requested that he come up and complete the job. In the 
early part of October, 1973, Bateman and Berg met 
on the job and reviewed the work that had to be done. 
Mr. Berg stated that what was left to be done was "pretty 
obvious." (T. 2452) . Thereafter, Bateman commenced to 
complete the electrical work on the project, for which he 
was paid directly by Lignell. 
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Lignell, anticipating the closing of the project, 
requested from Berg a final list of all the extras that 
were claimed for the project. On November 1, 1973, Berg 
submitted a list to Lignell which Lignell assumed was the 
final list of extras (Ex. 130). In January of 1974, Lig-
nell, Todd and Clifford Berg met at Berg's house to resolv' 
some of the conflicts relating to additional costs and ex· 
penses on the project and agreed, they thought, to certau 
set-offs relating to work that had not been done. 
In February of 1974, some seven months late, the 
project was finally ready to close. To this end, Title 
Insurance Agency, which was representing the permanent 
lender on the project, obtained from the contractor a list 
of the final pay-off amounts and holdbacks remaining on tli· 
project. In addition, a statement was signed by Clifford 
Berg, William Berg and Frank Berg reciting the existence 
of the joint venture and releasing any claims it had again. 
the premises (Ex's. 164, 165). Lignell and Todd, although 
claiming that they had overpaid on the construction contra 
provided Title Insurance Agency with the necessary fundst 
pay the remaining debts on the project. In reliance upon 
the documents executed by the brothers Berg, Title Insur· 
ance Agency disbursed the funds to all the subcontractors, 
the exception of the drywaller, and closed the project. 
Mr. Ellertson, president of Title Insurance Agency, testi· 
fied that but for the work of Lignell and Todd and their 
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providing the funds necessary to clear off the liens or 
claims which could become liens on the premises, the proj-
ect could not have been closed (T. 1676). 
Evidence adduced at the trial, but not permitted to 
go to the jury, indicated that the joint venture was never 
licensed as a contractor by the State of Utah and that the 
partnership, although previously licensed, had not been li-
censed from April, 1971, to July, 1974. The partnership 
obtained a new license in July, 1974, which was revoked 
by the State in December, 1974 (T. 3038-3048, R. C993). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY VERDICT IN THE CASE OF LIGNELL AND TODD 
VERSUS BERG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW 
AND THE EVIDENCE. 
The partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Com-
pany, recovered a judgment against Lignell and Todd in the 
amount of $159,148.68 (R. Cl391). This sum was apparently 
composed of $42r653.68 which was awarded to the drywallers 
against the partnership (R. Cl390), $61,693.01 which was 
awarded to the electrician (Murray) against the partner-
ship (R. Cl391), both of which were then passed through 
to Lignell and Todd, and in addition thereto~ $54,801.99 
was added for extras claimed by the partnership in its own 
behalf (Ex. 252). 
Both the partnership and the Surety agreed through-
out the trial that they were indebted to the subcontractors 
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in the amount of their claims (T. 252). In fact, they 
actually assisted the subcontractors in presenting their 
cases and in obtaining their judgments. Plaintiffs are 
not contesting in this appeal the judgments rendered agair 
surety and the partnership in favor of the subcontractors, 
although there were numerous defenses to those claims that 
surety and the partnership either waived or chose not to 
assert. It does not follow, however, that a judgment 
against the surety and the partnership resulting from 
the waiver of defenses and the failure to distinguish arnon 
the parties should, or can, be passed through and become 
a judgment against the owners as was done in this case. 
A. Neither the contract standards nor the parties 
involved in the subcontracts. were the same as those be tweet 
the owners and the contractor. As far as the joint _ventur 
was concerned the standard of workmanship required was set 
forth in the Construction Contract (Ex. 9). Therein it is 
stated, in ,Ill. 4: 
"The Contractor warrants to the Owner and 
the Architect that all materials and equipment 
incorporated in the work will be new unless 
otherwise specified, and that all work will 
be of good quality, free f~om faults and de-
fects and in conformance w~th the Contract 
DOCUments. All work not so conforming to 
these standards may be considered defective." 
(emphasis added) 
The subcontracts with the drywallers and the electrician, 
however, contained no standards or warranties concerning 
the quality of the work to be performed (Ex's. 15, 57). 
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As a result, work which might be permissible under the 
subcontracts would not necessarily meet the standards of 
the construction contract. Plaintiffs submit that such 
was the case in this suit. 
B. Much of the work performed was defective. 
The testimony was uncontroverted that after the drywall 
had been painted there were numerous streaks and shadows 
on the joints (T. 1325, 1846, 1873, 1878, 1899, 1922). 
Some of the witnesses indicated that this was the fault 
of the drywaller because of improper sanding (T. 1843-1845, 
1872, 1879, 2321). The drywaller contended, however, 
that it was relieved of any responsibility because the 
walls had been painted. No one disputed that the streaks 
and shadows existed or that the owners had spent in excess 
of $28,000.00 to correct the problem (Ex's. 153, 154). 
Similarly, there was uncontroverted testimony that 
some of the halls were wavy and "looked like a snake." 
(T. 1843, 2211). The drywaller accused the carpenter and 
the carpenter claimed that he was relieved of responsibility 
because the drywaller had nailed its wallboard on the studs. 
Again, there was no dispute that the defective work existed, 
the dispute revolved around which subcontractor was re-
sponsible. In this regard it mattered not to the owners 
which subcontractor was at fault, since they had no 
privity with any of them. The owners, under their contract, 
looked exclusively to the general contractor to deliver 
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a building free of defects. This it failed to do. The 
owners had no responsibility to show which of the subcon-
tractors was at fault, this was the burden of the general 
contractor if it chose to contest the subcontractors' 
claims. 
Here, the subcontractors' claims were not 
contested by the contractor, but that can in no way shift 
the burden of proof concerning the cause of the defects 
to the owners. All the owners were required to do was to 
show that the building was tendered to them in defective 
condition under the terms of the construction contract. 
This they did. Thus, although a subcontractor might ha~ 
convinced the jury that the defects were either not its 
fault or that it had been relieved of the responsibility 
therefor, such a showing would not relieve the general 
contractor from the ultimate responsibility for the de-
feet. 
There is absolutely no dispute that one of the uni: 
508-A, contained a noxious, vomitous odor which commenced 
in the spring of 197 3, when it was sprayed with wall spray 
by the drywaller (T. 1334, 1908-1909, 2203). The testi-
money was uncontroverted that the smell persisted, in spH 
of numerous attempts to alleviate it, until the apartment 
was completely gutted, the wall board, tile, drapes and 
carpets, cabinets and doors were replaced and the apartmen 
repainted (T. 1440-1442, 1493, 2203-2205). Although Mr· 
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Copinga, the very person who applied the spray, admitted 
that when he last checked the apartment in the spring of 
1976 it still smelled; he, nonetheless, disclaimed any 
responsibility for it (T. 2329). No one contended that 
the smell was the owners' fault. Plaintiffs clearly showed 
that the apartment smelled when the building was delivered 
to fuem and that as a result the apartment was uninhabitable 
and that they were required to forego two years of rental 
income and expended $3,700.00 to correct the defect (T. 1441-
1447, Ex. 207). The contractor presented no evidence refuting 
Plaintiffs' claim that the building was defective. 
With respect to the drywall, Berg acknowledged 
that the construction contract required good work, but 
admitted that the job, in his estimation, was "average" 
(T. 161, 2790). Mr. Jay Memmott testified that the work 
was not of good quality and characterized it as being 
"poor to mediocre" (T. 1853). Further testimony indicated 
that the wall spray texture was inconsistent, which in 
some apartments resulted in big "globs" on the walls (T. 
1324-1325, 1842, 1851, 1880). There were gaps in the sheetrock 
(T. 1893, 1969), doorbells covered by sheetrock (T. 935-90), 
holes for electrical outlets cut too large (T. 1877) and 
round holes cut for square doorbells all of which had to 
be repaired at the owners' expense (T. 1899). 
wiring that did not meet the code was installed 
by the electricians (T. 935.72-935.73, 935.91-935.92). 
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This had to be replaced at the expense of Lignell and Todc 
(T. 1814). Many of the electrical connections did not war 
appliances were not hooked up and switches were installed 
seven feet off the ground (T. 2185, 2206-2207, 2209, 2396· 
2397, 2421). The owners were required to pay more than 
$40,000.00 to complete the electrical work and correct the 
defects, and bring the building up to an acceptable stand~ 
(Ex ' s • 15 3 , 15 4 ) • 
Although Berg did not contest the electricians' 
charge for their work, it is clear that that work did not 
meet the contract standard of "good" quality for purposes 
of determining amounts due between the owners and the 
general contractor. In addition, doors swung the wrong 
way (T. 1895) and light fixtures were hung so that they 
were broken off by opening doors (T. 1894, 1969). Gobs of 
glue were left by the cabinet subcontractor (T. 1884-1886, 
2217) and numerous areas of the project ha~ to be repainte 
(T. 1883, 1886). These defects were all paid for by the 
owners. 
c. The project was delivered late to the owners. 
Mr. Berg testified that the arrangement with the owners 
was that the project would be built sequentially starting 
in reverse alphabetical order with the C building first 
(T. 1172-1173). The original completion date for the en· 
tire project was November 16, 1972 (1173). When the 
additional floors were added to the B and A buildings, 
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the completion date for the project was extended to 
July 15, 1973. Although the changes to the c building 
were very modest, it was not completed until January, 
1973, and the entire project was not closed until February 
of 197 4. 
It was important to the owners that the project 
be completed promptly so as not to jeopardize the long-
term financing. Further, the owners anticipated achieving 
a substantial rental volume prior to the time the long-
term loan was to be closed (T. 766, 767, 2285-2286). This 
was well-known by Berg (T. 690). Due to the delay in 
completion not only were the rentals lost, but $200,000.00 
was withheld by the permanent lender until the required 
rental level was achieved (T. 3301-3302). 
D. The charges for electrical extras were dupli-__ _ 
cative, did not distinguish between the owners' and the 
contractor's responsibility and often related to defective 
or LU1completed work. The evidence on the electrical por-
tion of the case clearly showed that many of the electri-
cians' change orders were duplicated, often several times 
over (T. 337, 345, 351, 361, 364, 366, 371, 381-A, 384, 
388, 409, 419, 420, 422, 424, 486, 488, 490, 493, 495-
497, 500). The duplicate tickets, however, usually contained 
different prices for the same item or contained no price 
at all (T. 493-495). Mr. Comstock readily admitted the 
duplications but was often unable to identify the ticket 
for which he was seeking compensation or state how much he 
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was charging (T. 498). Several times, in response to 
inquiries from his counsel concerning his charges, he 
responded that he "didn't know," "would only be guessing," 
"didn't know what was done" or that he "didn't handle the 
books" (T. 363, 368-369, 377, 380, 386, 488, 492, 498-
499, 528, 551, 570, 935-112, 935-24). Although Mr. Corn-
stock acknowledged that there were some credits due for 
work not done, he did not know how much (T. 369-371). 
In addition to the voluminous work tickets gen-
erated by the electricians (Ex's. 21, 22, 26, 58), Mr. 
Comstock on December 18, 1972, sent a letter to Berg 
telling him that all prior change orders were void and 
that new change orders would be issued (Ex. 35). At 
trial, however, Comstock sought compensation for these 
"void" change orders as well as the new ones issued in 
their place. Because of the voluminous and duplicative 
change orders and Comstock's letter voiding them out 
Lignell requested a clarification of the electrician's 
billings (T. 770-771, 820). On or about March 1, 1973, 
Lignell and Berg met with the Comstocks to determine the 
exact status of the electrical charges. At that meeting, 
the Comstocks presented a list of all the claimed change 
order (Ex. 100), which list Lignell reviewed; he approved 
some and rejected some. It was his understanding that 
there were no other change orders relating to the elec-
trical work on the project at that time (T. 768-779). 
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In January, 1973, Comstock left the project because 
of financial difficulties and was replaced on March 1, 
1973, by Murray. Although there was a dispute concerning 
how much electrical work remained to be done, in March and 
again in April Comstock sent a bill to Berg stating that 
the total amount due to it for work on the Incline project 
amounted to $7,412.04 (Ex's. 51, 52). 
Mr. Comstock, the architect's representative, Mr. 
Huss, and the Comstock foreman all testified that when 
Comstock left the job in January, 1973, some two months 
after the entire project was originally to have been com-
pleted, there had been no electrical work done in the A 
building (T. 530, 884, 910). At the trial, however, 
Comstock presented numerous change orders relating directly 
to the A building or the additional 22 units, part of 
which were located in that building (Ex's. 21-A, 21-B, 
21-C, 21-J, 22-V, 21-EE, 21-Y, 21-FF), all of which were 
apparently charged to the contractor and agreed to by Berg 
at the trial. However, any charge over to the owners for 
these items would be duplicative, since the work involved 
was part of the original, or the amended, price fixed by 
the construction contract. In addition, Comstock admitted 
that many items billed to the contractor by Comstock were 
not completed. Some items had even been refused by Berg 
but were, nevertheless, included in Comstock's billings 
(T. 557-559). 
-21-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.... 
When Murray left the job in October, it sent Berg 
a bill for $7,050.00 representing the total amount it 
claimed was due to it (Ex. 62, p. 7). Based upon a doc-
ument prepared by its foreman, Mrs. Comstock maintained 
that when Murray left there were only six apartments re-
maining to be wired (Ex. 116). Mr. Weaver, the Murray 
foreman, testified, however, that he meant that there were 
six apartments remaining to be rough wired. Weaver furthe: 
testified that rough wiring constituted approximately 
40% of the job, and that in addition to the six apartments 
there were numerous apartments that had to be finished, 
which included the installation of the plugs and switches, 
hanging the fixtures, etc. (T. 1758-1759, 935-71). Furthe: 
Mr. Weaver testified, the outside wiring remained to be 
done as did the elevators, recreation rooms, main services 
air conditioners, furnaces, appliances and many other ite~ 
(T. 1753-1755). Mr. Bateman testified that when he came 
onto the project in October he wired the kitchens, con-
nected appliances, installed circuit breakers, installed 
plugs and switches, wired the storage areas, elevators Md 
recreational rooms and did all the exterior lighting. In 
addition, the air conditioners were connected in the sprin 
(T. 1804-1812). 
Although there were only two apartments added to 
the original portion of the B building, Comstock apparent· 
ly charged for three (T. 381, 478). Comstock also chargee 
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$865.00 "to add an apartment to Building c" (Ex. 21-U) 
and also charged $195.10 for the subfeed to that added 
apartment (Ex. 21-II). Later, however, when Murray came 
on the project it charged $875.00 for wiring the additional 
22 units (Ex. 58-1). Thus, the added apartment in the c 
building was charged for at least once by Comstock and once 
again by Murray, as were the two extra apartments in 
Building B. Berg testified, however, that the wiring 
charge for all the added apartments was included in the 
total bid to the owners for the extra units (T. 2908). 
Comstock submitted at least three tickets relating 
to three-phase power for the elevators (T. 497, Ex's. 
22-V, 21-P, 21-Z). Nevertheless, one of the first changes 
requested by Murray was to "install 3-phase power and 
meter for elevator in Building A." (Ex. 58-2) • The 3-
phase wiring, however, was done by Mr. Bateman at the 
owners' expense (T. 1833). 
At the trial both Comstock and Murray produced 
change orders for "wiring the rec. room" (T. 374, 595, 
2952). Comstock also charged Berg for the "added services" 
to three of the additional apartments in the A and B build-
ings (T. 315, Ex. 21-A) and then later charged him for "12 
additional services" in Building B (T. 353, Ex. 21-L). 
Thus, Berg apparently agreed to pay twice for the ser-
vices run to at least two apartments. In addition, these 
items were also included within the charge by Murray for 
the additional 22 units. 
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Comstock's charges to the contractor also containe 
several items that clearly were not the owners' responsibi. 
(Ex's. 21-N, 21-0, 26-65, T. 404). In addition, one chang' 
ticket which related to the elevator in Building A was 
dated June 15, 1972, although that building originally did 
not have an elevator and the decision to install one was 
not made until sometime in August or September of that ye~ 
(T. 1503, 2925-2926). 
Mrs. Schoppe, the apartment manager, testified 
that many of the electrical outlets did not work and that 
there were several instances where stoves and other ap-
pliances in the apartments had not even been wired (T. 
2186, 2206-2207). Mr. Weaver testified that he repaired 
numerous items of Comstock's work that did not function 
properly (935-88 to 935-90). Bateman also testified that 
he did a great deal of electrical repair work (T. 935-75). 
Mr. Weaver testified that there should have been no charge 
for correction of these errors (T. 1756). Apparently, 
however, there was (Ex's. 58-6 to 58-43). 
The tickets submitted by Murray charging for this 
repair work are revealing. Exhibit 58-22, for instance, 
which relates to the repair of a disposal contains the no· 
tation "Hot lead not in wire nut." Exhibit 58-16, a 
Murray charge to repair a plug in a kitchen refrigerator 
states, "Outlet box behind refrigerator not made up, both 
hot leg and neutral left open in box." Further, Exhibit 
58-14, an "extra" to repair a duplex receptacle, states: 
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"Found f~ed wires (hot and neutral) 
tucked back ~n box. Neither were stripped 
or had ever been connected to the duplex." 
Other tickets contain similar notations and indicate 
that Comstock made many mistakes in its wiring (Ex's. 58-10, 
58-20). Mr. Weaver recalled one instance where the refrig-
erator would not work unless the light was turned on (T. 
1756). These charges were apparently passed on to Berg 
as "extras" but clearly were not the responsibility of the 
owners. 
Mrs. Comstock testified that the hourly charge for 
her employees was $12.00/hour (T. 2375). Some of the 
Murray tickets, however, showed a charge greatly in excess 
of that. Fifteen minutes to repair a short, which was 
probably guarantee work anyway, was billed at $12.00 (Ex. 
58-43) which is an effective rate of $48.00/hour. Other 
tickets reflect similar charges (Ex's. 58-25 & 26, 58-23 & 
24, 58-21 & 22, 58-17 & 18). All of these charges were 
apparently accepted by Berg at the trial. In addition, 
several of the tickets apparently making up the claim of 
Comstock and Murray were never admitted into evidence 
(Ex's. 21E, 21F). Nevertheless, Berg also accepted those 
"extras." 
It is against this background of duplicate tickets, 
charges for nonexistent work and work not completed, 
varying rates, invoices relating to repair items and charges 
for items that were not the owners' responsibility that 
the testimony of Mr. Berg must be considered. 
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E. The trial court committed serious evidentiary 
errors. The partnership's judgment was premised upon thre, 
exhibits: 210, which was a schedule of "extras" to the 
contract; 234, which was a schedule of the payments made 
by the owners which the partnership "agreed" were charge-
able to the contract; and 252, which was a summary of the 
other two exhibits. The jury used the precise figures 
from Exhibit 252 in awarding its judgments. 
During the course of the trial the electricians 
found themselves in quite a dilemma. They had submitted 
a multitude of purported change orders and other letters 
and documents in an attempt to establish their claim again: 
the partnership but had been unable to get a summary of 
their claims admitted; thus, the precise amount they were 
claiming remained a mystery. To this end, Exhibits 210 
and 252, prepared by the surety and the partnership, solvei 
this problem for the electricians and got to the jury a 
figure it could easily pick out even though there was no 
testimony to support it. The admission of these exhibits 
was erroneous because Berg lacked the necessary knowledge 
to lay an adequate foundation for their admission, a fact 
he readily admitted. 
1. Exhibits were admitted without adequate 
foundation. Exhibit 210 presented a lump sum figure for 
claimed "electrical extras." When quizzed about the spec· 
ifics of that figure, Berg repeatedly testified that he 
"wasn't sure" (T. 2906, 2908) or "did not know" (T. 2924)· 
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When confronted with duplicate tickets and asked for which 
ticket the owners were being charged, how much and whether 
the same item was being charged twice, Berg stated over 
and over again that he did not know (T. 2902, 2906-2909, 
2916 I 2923-2924 I 2929-29301 2935-29351 2938-2939 I 2942) 
0 
Berg stated he was "not familiar" with the list of extras 
from Cosrntock (T. 2905). Although Berg acknowledged that 
it would be an error to charge for the duplicated items, 
he could not state that that had not been done (T. 2919, 
2942). Berg stated that he took the figures from 
the electrician and was relying on him (T. 2909). When 
asked by the trial court whether there was any document 
he would like to review before he proceeded further, Berg 
responded that he had to get an accounting from the elec-
trician (T. 2910). When pressed for an explanation of 
the $40,069.01 figure, which was on the exhibit from which 
the jury took the figure awarded against the owners, Berg 
declared that it was not his figure and stated repeatedly 
that the figures were those of the electrician (T. 2924, 
2931-2932). The electrician, however, had also repeat-
edly testified that he did not know the details of the figures. 
Although Berg did admit that certain charges, in-
cluding some $19,250.00 for wiring the additional units, would 
be an extra to the contractor from the electrician but 
would not be properly chargeable to the owners since it 
was included in the fixed price for the extra units, he 
could not say whether or not that $19,250.00 was, in fact, 
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included in the figure for electrical extras shown on the 
exhibits (T. 2935-2936, 2942-2943). 
Berg testified that he did not think it should be 
an extra to the owners to get the electrical current to 
the added units (T. 2905), and that the bid for the extra 
elevator was for one that worked when tne buttons were 
pushed and that it would not work without electricity (T. 
2924-2925). Berg further testified that no extra charge 
was being made for extending the air conditioner feeds 
(T. 2916), yet, all these items were apparently included 
in the electrician's charges to the contractor and passed 
on to the owners (Ex's. 21-A, 21-L, 22-V, 22-SS, 22-RR). 
Plaintiffs submit that they were entitled to know 
the composition of the lump sum electrical figure on the 
exhibits and that it is not too much to ask that any clahe 
damages be stated in sufficient detail so that the owners 
could ascertain what items had been excluded or included 
in that figure. Mr. Berg could not tell whether Plaintiff: 
had been charged once, twice, three times or four times 
for some items (T. 2931); whether they were charged for 
mistakes of other subcontractors; whether they were charge: 
for items not done; whether they were charged for those 
items Berg said were not extras to them or whether they 
were, in fact, charged for items for which Berg testified 
that no charge was being made. Further, Plaintiffs could 
not tell whether they had received a credit for those 
items acknowledged by Mr. Comstock (T. 369-371), or for 
-28-
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work that had not been done.2 
Rule 19 of the Rules of Evidence provides: 
. "As a prerequisite for the testimony of a 
w~tness on a relevant or material matter there 
must be evidence that he has personal kn~wledge 
thereof." 
The record is clear that Berg had absolutely no 
knowledge of the contents of the electrical figure in 
Exhibit 210. In fact, he admitted that it carne from someone 
else; clearly, Berg lacked the required personal knowledge 
for the exhibits to be admitted. Plaintiffs timely inter-
posed an objection to the admission of the exhibit setting 
forth the grounds enumerated herein (T. 2628, 2307), 
nevertheless, the trial court received that exhibit over 
Plaintiffs' objections. Plaintiffs also timely objected to 
the admission of Exhibit 252 (which was a summary of the 
conclusions contained in Exhibits 210 and 234 (T. 3077)), 
because of the defects in Exhibit 210 and because it did 
not meet the statutory requirements of §78-25-16(5); 
nevertheless, the court also admitted that exhibit (T. 
3077-3078). There can be no dispute that those exhibits 
had a substantial impact in bringing about the verdict 
since the jury awards corresponded to the penny with the 
amounts set forth therein (R. Cl017, 1033, 1037). This 
pivotal evidentiary error alone would require sending the 
2Even if there remained only six apartments to be 
wired, a position that is clearly not supported by the evi-
dence, a credit therefor would come to $5,250.00 (6 x 
$875.00). 
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damages issues between the owners and the contractor back 
for a new trial. 
Plaintiffs submit that the admission of those ex-
hibits were contrary to the rules of evidence and the 
statutes of this state, and were prejudicial to their cause 
By claiming a lack of knowledge concerning the details of 
the exhibit, Berg was able to thwart any effective inves-
tigation into the possibility that the figures were 
erroneous while not suffering any adverse affect because 
of this lack of knowledge. If this type of conduct is 
sanctioned by this Court, future witnesses in this state 
will need only claim lack of knowledge, either real or 
feigned, to the details of any exhibit, in order to stifle 
cross-examination, while at the same time receiving the 
benefits of the unsupported exhibit. 
2. Blatantly erroneous exhibits were allowed 
into evidence. Another evidentiary error was committed 
by the court with relation to Exhibit 235 and Exhibit 251, 
which was its visual counterpart. 
Mr. Mark Hatch testified that Exhibit 23 5 represen~ 
ed an analysis of the draws and disbursements on the Inclir 
Terrace project. Mr. Hatch readily admitted, however, 
that the "checks paid" column included only those items 
"chargeable to Berg." What was "chargeable to Berg" was 
derived by Mr. Hatch from the testimony of Dwayne Liddell 
with certain "adjustments" (T. 3025, 3086). 
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!rr. Liddell, however, indicated that his calcula-
tions did not cover all expenditures on the project. 
His testimony went only to those expenditures that were 
attributable to the contractor; therefore, items that 
were outside the construction contract, such as landscaping, 
carpets, drapes, demolition, swimming pool, etc., were 
excluded from his calculations (T. 1712-1713, 1722, 1729). 
From !IT. Liddell's figures !IT. Hatch further deducted 
some $85,000.00 of actual cash payments by the owners 
for such items as additional painting, concrete and elec-
trical work and cleanup. Because a portion of the construc-
tion was assumed by the owners and paid for directly by 
them, the expenditures for those items were not reflected 
in !IT. Hatch's exhibit, although the funds borrowed to 
pay for those items appeared as draws. Thus, as presented 
in the exhibit, the "checks paid" amount actually reflected 
considerably less than was actually paid by the owners for 
a project free from defects. The "loan receipts" column, 
on the other hand, included all funds deposited into the 
Incline Terrace account by the lending institutions. 
The exhibits were contrived in such a way that "checks 
paid" would never equal "draws" because of the different 
composition of the two columns; therefore, they pre-
sented the erroneous impression that the owners had with-
drawn substantial sums of money from the project. While 
Lignell did admit that some funds were withdrawn, the 
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testimony was uncontroverted that it was done with the 
approval of the lender and that all funds were paid back 
plus an additional $211,000.00 (T. 1510, 1648-1649, 1800). 
l-ir. Hatch acknowledged that the exhibit was not 
accurate (T. 3088, 3107-3110) and that many more funds had 
expended on the project than his exhibits showed. Further, 
Mr. Hatch admitted that a considerable amount of the 
"draws" may not have actually been received by the own-
ers (T. 3089, 3098-3106) and that the "draws" column was 
in fact, overstated (T. 3114). 
The court, over the objections of Plaintiffs, 
nevertheless admitted the exhibits into evidence (T. 3026· 
3032). Plaintiffs submit that the exhibits were not a 
fair analysis of the evidence, were based upon erroneous 
conclusions and were prepared solely for the purpose of 
inflaming the jury. These exhibits and the erroneous 
implications they conveyed most assuredly misled the 
jury and were extremely prejudicial to Plaintiffs; their 
admission was clearly error. 
F. Omrnissions by the contractor or subcontractors 
in their bids and construction blunders were erroneously 
passed through to the owners. Mr. Berg testified that 
the joint venture had a fixed price contract with the 
owners and that if an item were more than the subcontrac-
tor's bid, it would be stuck with it; if less, it would 
make a greater profit (T. 1068-1069). In the instant case, 
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however, when an item turned out to be m::>re than the bid 
it was passed through to the owners in the form of an 
"extra." 
Lignell received a firm price bid for the additional 
elevator in Building A. Although Berg testified that the 
price included a properly functioning elevator, he apparently 
passed through as an "extra" the cost of wiring the ele-
vator so it would work. 
The owners received a "fixed price" bid for the 
22 additional apartment units. Berg testified that this 
included the wiring (T. 2943), but then later changed his 
mind and testified that that price did not include getting 
the electricity to the apartments. Berg also testified that 
the extension of the air conditioner feeds was included 
in the bid for the extra units but apparently this cost 
was also passed through to the owners. 3 
Lignell testified that the price quoted him by Berg 
for the recreation room in the C building was $8,000.00 
(T. 3292-3294). At the trial a charge was made on Exhibit 
210 for an additional $3,000.00 for a furnace in that room 
although the plans from the very beginning showed a furnace 
was required (T. 2673-2674) and Mr. Hatch admitted that 
there had never been a similar charge by the subcontractor 
for that item (T. 3127). Apparently, the cost of wiring 
3Berg apparently passed on to the owners whatever 
electrical charges came to him, regardless of the source 
or cause and without distinguishing whether they were al-
ready included in the construction contract (T. 2517, 2951). 
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the recreation room was also added to the list of "extras" 
although the original plans provided for numerous electric 
outlets and switches in that area (T. 2937). 
The range hood fans were listed by brand name ~d 
model number on the specifications. Berg testified that 
they were a part of the contract (T. 1164) . The electri-
cian acknowledged that he knew about them before he submit: 
his bid (T. 510) and the Comstock bid sheets contained 
numerous references to the hood fans (Ex. 43) • Neverthe-
less, this, too, was apparently lumped into Berg's list of 
extras (Ex. 210), although Mr. Weaver testified that the 
hood fans were not connected when he left the project (T. 
935-100). In addition, although Berg knew that hood f~s 
were required prior to the time that he submitted the bid 
for the additional 22 units and the addendum was signed 
(T. 2922) , he also apparently charged an extra for wiring 
the hood fans in those additional 22 units. 
The sheet metal subcontractor "forgot" to include 
bath fans in his bid, Berg testified. It was undisputed, 
however, that the bath fans were on the plans from the 
very beginning; nonetheless, an "extra" was charged to 
the owners for that item (Ex. 210). 
Berg admitted that in October, 1971, he was aware 
that the City required wet and dry standpipes, stairs to 
the roof, enclosed stairs and other items to be installed 
in the building. After obtaining that knowledge, the 
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construction contract was executed. Berg made no changes 
or modifications in the bid to the owners although he 
stated that he went over it several times to make sure 
it was right (T. 2678). The items required by the City 
were also passed through to Lignell and Todd as "extras" 
(Ex. 210). 
Berg was erroneously informed by a city building 
inspector that certain fire doors were not required. Although 
they were on the plans, Berg did not put them in. There-
after, the lender's architect determined that as built, 
the building did not meet the fire code and that the fire 
doors would have to be installed (T. 1572-1573, 3358-3360). 
The cost of redoing the work and hanging the fire doors 
was passed to the owners as an "extra." 
G. The contractor's accounting was erroneous. 
Although "extras" were liberally passed on to the owners 
the owners charges usually fell victim to certain "adjust-
ments" by the contractor's accountant. Thus, a $3,000.00 
retaining wall that was on the plans but not built (T.~~) 
was grudgingly "accepted" as a back charge by the contrac-
tor in the amount of $1,000.00 (Ex. 210). Some $60,000.00 
of other work that was ~ done, however, was completely 
ignored (T. 2254, 3308-3313, Ex. 207, 257) • 
Actual out-of-pocket expenditures to complete the 
project and cure the defects, amounting to some $75,000.00, 
primarily for painting, concrete and electrical work, were 
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likewise omitted from the t t • con rae or s accounting (Ex's. 
153, 210, 234). Further, Mr. Hatch admitted that the 
schedule of charges "acceptable" to the contractor (Ex. 
234), was based on 21 additional units when, in fact, 
there were really 22 (T. 3125-3126). 
-
Mrs. Schoppe, the apartment manager, was hired by 
Berg to do the heavy construction cleaning of the apart-
ments (T. 2197, 2221). She hauled lumber and debris, 
chipped gobs of plaster and glue out of the tubs and off 
of the cabinets and scraped paint off of the windows. Trn 
value of the construction cleaning was placed at $3,675.0·: 
(T. 2213). Apparently, because she was paid directly for 
work by the owners, that too was excluded. 
Mr. Berg testified that the maximum profit expect! 
from the project was $56,000.00 (T. 1067). Since the con· 
tract amounted to $1,455,000.00 this would have been a 
margin of 3. 84%. Nevertheless, Exhibit 210 claimed a 151 
markup, amounting to $12,726.07, on the "extras" of selec· 
subcontractors because that was "standard" in the communi· 
ty (T. 2625). Berg did not testify, however, that he 
expected to make that markup on the subcontractors' work 
on the project. In addition, Berg could not and did not 
differentiate between those subcontractors' "extras" that 
were included in the fixed price bid for the additionall: 
units and those that were not (T. 2628). In spite of 
this, the partnership was allowed to recover the requeste: 
15% markup on the joint venture's fixed price contract. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP. 
The entry of a judgment against Plaintiffs and in 
favor of Berg Brothers Construction Company, the partner-
ship, constituted clear error because: 
A. The construction contract which is the subject 
of this action was between Plaintiffs and a joint venture 
called Berg Construction Company. 
B. Berg Construction Company is a different legal 
entity than Berg Brothers Construct~on Company. 
C. Any confusion in names should be chargeable to 
the Bergs, who chose the names utilized. 
D. The joint venture, the entity which was the 
only defendant in the suit which is the subject of this 
appeal, made no counterclaim. 
E. The Defendant joint venture, the partnership, 
the partners constituting said partnership, and the in-
dividual Frank c. Berg, are all estopped to deny the 
existence of the joint venture and the fact that the joint 
venture was the contracting party to the construction 
contract and the performance bond. 
The error complained of herein was raised by a 
Motion to Strike, a Motion to Dismiss, a Motion for Directed 
Verdict, a Motion to Reconsider, Objections to Instructions, 
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1 
Proposed Instruction, a Motion for Judgment Notwi thstandi: 
the Verdict and a Motion for New Trial (T 25 
. 44, 3196-
3203, 3235-3251, 3383, R. Cl360-1364). In each instance 
the trial court ruled against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
contend that the trial court erred on this point at each 
stage of the proceedings, culminating in the award of~ 
erroneous judgment and the erroneous denial of the Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The heading of 
this point is intended to embrace in one argument the 
entire series of errors on this point. 
A. The entities involved in the construction 
contract were not properly distinguished by the trial 
court. Other than Plaintiffs there were three separate 
legal entities involved in the written construction con-
tract which is the subject of this litigation (Ex. 9). 
One is an individual;one is a partnership and one is a 
joint venture. Because all are of the family Berg and 
because they chose to do business in ways which are very 
similar, there was a great potential for confusion ruoong 
the separate entities, particularly between the ongoing 
construction partnership between Cliff and Bill Berg and 
the joint venture formed between them and their brother 
Frank Berg for the sole purpose of handling the one con· 
struction project which is the subject of this litigation 
4Although Cliff Berg testified that he had built 
other apartments with his older brother (T. 1006), thl~ 
particular joint venture was to terminate upon completlon 
of the subject project \T. 2660). 
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Those legal entities are: 
1. Frank C. Berg, an individual; 
2. Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg, a part-
nership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction company, and 
3. Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg, a part-
nership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company, and 
Frank C. Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a Berg 
Construction Company. The underlining has been added to 
point up the two entities which the trial court persistent-
ly, and erroneously, failed to distinguish from one another, 
and the confusing similarity of their names. The record 
indicates, and counsel's observat~on of the trial court's 
handling of this matter affirms, that the trial court 
didn't recognize that the two names denominated separate 
legal entities until September 23, 1976 (T. 3066-3068), at 
which time he felt it to be too late in the trial to 
change his prior stance. 
B. The failure to distinguish between the joint 
venture and the partnership was prejudicial to Plaintiffs. 
The obfuscation of the distinction between the joint ven-
ture and the partnership was critically prejudicial to 
Plaintiffs for the following reasons. 
(a) The joint venture never, at any time, had a 
contractor's license in utah or elsewhere. This was known 
~ 
to all parties very early in the litigation and the joint 
venture recognized the effect of being unable to so plead. 
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{b) A counterclaim by the Defendant joint ventur: 
would have been subject to dismissal for lack of a con-
tractor's license--a defense that was recognized in 
dismissing the claim of Western Drywall (an unlicensed 
partnership) against the Plaintiff owners. (The partners; 
Bcvr"l Bro\'1-er.;, 
however, refused to raise the issue of lack of license; a: 
result, Western Drywall's claim against it was not dismis: 
and ultimately ripened into a judgment.) 
(c) Dismissal of the joint venture's counterclair 
would have defeated the bonding company's claim over agai: 
the owners, so the bonding company had an interest in 
perpetuating the confusion over the legal entities. 
(d) Instead of counterclaiming for the joint 
venture, the counterclaim was carefully drawn to be that 
of only Clifford and William Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers 
Construction Company, a partnership, one of the two en-
tities comprising the joint venture. Prior to the trial, 
all counsel believed that this partnership had a valid 
Utah Contractor's License when the construction agreement 
was made and performed, so that the contractor and bondin1 
company believed that the ploy of thus limiting the counti 
claim would finesse the fatal flaw in the joint venture's 
power to recover on the construction contract. [As is 
fully developed in Point V below, it was discovered durin: 
trial that the partnership did not have a valid Utah 
Contractor's License, but the trial court refused to adnli: 
evidence on that point.] 
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The contractor and bonding company correctly pre-
dicted the effect of their ploy. The trial court did not 
catch the finesse and the contractor and bonding company 
achieved what must, indeed, be a judicial rarity--a 
partnership which had no contractual relation with the 
owners recovered a judgment based upon a contract between 
the owners and an unlicensed third party, to-wit, the 
joint venture. Indeed, the partnership which recovered 
the judgment was not even a party to the action in which 
it recovered the judgment (See Amended Complaint R. BlBl-188, 
R. C636-643). As a simple reading of the Amended Complaint 
shows, the single Defendant named there~n was the joint 
venture, and the partnership was named solely in its cap-
acity as a joint venturer--one of those who formed together 
for the limited venture. A careful reading of the transcript 
shows that there is no evidence whatever of any agreement 
between the owners and the partnership, Berg Brothers 
Construction Company. On that point the jury had no con-
flicting evidence to weigh. The joint venture made no 
counterclaim and the counterclaimant had no contract 
(T. 2558). 
c. The Defendants should be estopped to deny the 
existence of the joint venture. The Defendants, in justi-
fying the interposition of~ of the joint venturers, 
have claimed that no joint venture existed because Frank 
c. Berg did not sign a written joint venture agreement, 
de3pite the multitude of documents admittedly signed 
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by the joint venture and all of the joint venturers. 
Plaintiffs have responded that, even if it were true that 
Frank C. Berg did not sign the proposed written joint 
venture agreement, he and the partnership were estopped tc 
deny the existence of the joint venture. The issue of 
estoppel was put to the jury, which decided it adversely 
to the Plaintiffs. 
When the evidence was in, Plaintiffs moved for a 
directed verdict in their favor on the counterclaim be-
cause (a) the joint venture made no counterclaim (the onl; 
counterclaim made was the one pleaded by the partnership, 
Berg Brothers Construction Company (R. A21-27; R. C827-
833; T. 2558)) and (b) the parties to the joint venture 
were, on the evidence adduced, estopped to deny the exis-
tence of the joint venture. That motion was denied, 
objections were timely made to Proposed Instructions 
per~itting the counterclaim of the partnership to be 
considered by the jury, instructions of estoppel as a 
matter of law were proposed by Plaintiffs, and refused by 
the trial court, Motions for a New Trial and for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict were made and denied. Every· 
thing necessary to preserve consideration of this matter 
on appeal was done. 
The undisputed evidence required a ruling of 
estoppel as a matter of law: 
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(a) The written Construction Agreement was between 
the Plaintiff owners and the joint venture (Ex. 9). (Copies 
of the face page and the signature page of that Exhibit 
are included in the appendix.) Frank c. Berg had been 
consulted about the project and knew the bonding company 
required his assets and credit on the construction contract 
(T. 3183-3134). 
(b) The performance bond, issued by the Defendant 
bonding company for the benefit of the Plaintiffs and 
verified to Plaintiffs' lenders, showed the joint venture 
as the principal and the Plaintiff owners as the obligee 
(Ex. 18). (An exact copy of this document is included in 
the appendix. ) 
(c) Frank C. Berg personally signed an application 
for that performance bond (Ex. 255). (A copy of the front 
and signature pages are included in the appendix.) He 
testified that he didn't know whether the document was 
f , , , bCA+- h , ~lled in when he s~gned ~t,,..that he kneww at ~twas 
to be used for (T. 3183). 
(d) When it carne time to close the permanent loan 
and pay off the construction loan, there were still unpaid 
bills, liened or lienable. The Plaintiff owners had arranged 
for funds borrowed by them to be deposited with Title 
Insurance Agency so that lienable claims could be paid and 
the permanent financing closed. Mr. Keith Ellertson, pres-
ident of Title Insurance Agency, testified that he had custody 
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of the funds of the owners and that he required certain 
written affirmances before he would release the sum of 
$115,576.10 belonging to Plaintiffs and being held by him, 
Those affirmances consist of Exhibit 164, signed and sworr. 
to by Clifford Berg on behalf of the joint venture, and 
Exhibit 165, signed on behalf of the joint venture by ~1 
three natural persons involved in the joint venture, 
Clifford, William and Frank C. Berg. (Copies of these 
documents are incorporated in the appendix.) l1r. 
Ellertson testified that he relied on these documents 
signed for the joint venture by all natural persons in-
valved in it, disbursed the $115,576.10 in reliance 
thereon (Ex. 162) and would not have so disbursed the 
money but for those documents (T. 1666-1667). This took 
place February 1, 197 4, at the close of the construction 
phase. 
D. All participants executed documents acknowled• 
the existence of the joint venture. Exhibit 164 is an 
Affidavit sworn to by Clifford Berg. It recites: 
11 2. He is a partner in Berg Brothers Constructior 
Company and is a member of that certain joint vent 
doing business as Berg Construction Company. 
3. He is authorized to execute documents ?n beh< 
of Berg Construction Company which are bind~ng, up: 
the said joint venture, all participants ~herel~: 
all members thereof. 11 (Ex. 164, page 1, l~nes 5 1. 
Thereafter he lists the persons to whom the Plaintiffs' ~ 
should be paid, affirming there to be no other liens or ~ 
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which could result in liens on the project. 
Exhibit 165 subordinates the lien rights of the 
joint venture to those of Traveler's Insurance company, 
the permanent lender, and Zions First National Bank, anoth-
er lender. It is significant in that it recites that the 
joint venture, Berg Construction Company, subordinates its 
liens and claims and in that it bears the signatures of 
all three of the brothers under the following designation: 
"Clifford Berg & William Berg, d/b/a Berg 
Brothers Construction, a partnership and Frank 
Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a 
Berg Construction Company. By /s/ Clifford M. 
Berg; By /s/ William Berg; and By /s/ Frank c. 
Berg. (Ex. 165, page 1) 
All three of the Berg Brothers either testified that their 
signatures were genuine and they knew the contents of the 
documents and that they would be relied upon in disbursing 
the Plaintiffs' moneylor such was stipulated to by their 
counsel (T. 1684, 3185). 
E. There was no contrary evidence respecting the 
joint venture. This Court has only recently had an occasion 
to reaffirm the necessity for making a clear and precise 
distinction among entities involved in multi-entity trans-
actions. In Mullins v. Evans, 560 P.2d 1116, (Utah 1977), 
the court distinguished among Ralph M. Evans, an individual, 
R. M. Evans and Company, Inc., and Royal Industries Corpora-
tion, Inc. Reversing a judgment in favor of one Mullins 
against Ralph M. Evans, the individual, and Royal Industries 
Corporation, the court noted: 
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'.'If anybody owed any obligation to Mr. 
Mulllns, it was the R. M. Evans Company, Inc., 
but that company was not made a party to this 
action." Mullins v. Evans, supra. 
In the instant case, if anybody has a claim against the 
Plain tiffs it was the joint venture, but the joint venture 
made no counterclaim. 
The errors embraced in the above rulings and judg· 
ment compel reversal. The multitude of arguments in the 
ensuing points, alone and in combination, support that vie 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF THE PARTNERSHIP, BERG 
BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 
In spite of the fact that the law of the State of 
Utah is clear that in the absence of an agreement or ~ 
express authorization by statute, attorney's fees cannot 
be awarded, Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976); 
Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953); ~ 
v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 433, 394 P.2d 77 (1964), the trial 
court after a hearing, and somewhat at variance with its 
Memorandum Decision, awarded judgment for attorney's fees 
to the bonding company and to Berg Brothers Construction 
Company, the partnership, against the owners, in the s~ 
of $74,000.00. The Memorandum Decision (R. 1395-7) sets 
out the trial court's rationale and determination on the 
matter of attorney's fees as follows: 
[The Court finds and concludes] 
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"4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
That Wes~ern~ Bailey, Murray, Comstock, 
B~rg.& F1del1ty.are the successful parties 
w1th1n the prov1sions of Chapter 14 u c A 1953. I 0 0 •I 
That Western & Bailey are entitled to re-
cover from Berg & Fidelity the sum of 
$11,000.00 attorneys' fees who in turn 
are entitled to recover a like amount from 
plaintiffs Lignell & Todd. 
That Murray & Comstock are entitled to recover 
from Berg & Fidelity the sum of $21,000.00 
attorneys' fees who in turn are entitled to 
recover a like amount from plaintiffs Lignell 
and Todd. 
That Berg is entitled to recover from Lignell 
& Todd the sum of $21,000.00 attorneys' fees. 
That Fidelity is entitled to recover from 
Lignell & Todd the sum of $21,000.00 attorneys' 
fees." 
It is noteworthy that, even at this late stage, no 
attempt was made by the trial court to distinguish between 
the partnership and the joint venture. The court simply 
used the all-embracing, non-specific term "Berg" in a 
Memorandum Decision adjudicating $74,000.00 in attorney's 
fees and some $25,000.00 in interest. 
A. There was no contract which provided for an 
award of attorney's fees. Prior to this decision many is-
sues which should have foreclosed the question of attorney's 
fees as it related to Plaintiffs had been resolved. The 
written contract upon which the suit of Lignell and Todd 
was based was not with the entity to whom the attorney's 
fees were awarded and did not provide for attorney's fees 
(Ex. 9). The contract upon which the suit between Lignell 
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and Todd and Fidelity was based, the performance bond, siJn. 
ilarly made no provision for attorney's fees (Supp. T. 44, 
Ex. 18). In addition, the contract upon which the subco~ 
tractors had sued Fidelity, the Labor and Material Bond, 
contained an express provision assuring Lignell and Todd 
against costs and expenses in suits upon that bond (Ex. 
18) • Since no tort claim was made by the contractor or thi 
bonding company against Lignell and Todd, Plaintiffs sub-
mit that there was no rational basis upon which the attorm 
fees could be awarded. 
B. Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in all 
suits brought by the subcontractors against them. While 
a portion of the suits by the electrical subcontractors 
and the drywallers and materialmen were actions brought 
under §14-2, et seq., Plaintiffs were not involved in 
those portions of the consolidated cases. As between the 
Plaintiffs and the electrical subcontractors, Murray and 
Comstock, all issues submit ted to the jury were determined 
in favor of the Plaintiffs, resulting in a verdict and 
judgment of no cause of action, and Lignell-Todd were 
awarded their costs as the successful party (R. Cl35S-131 
1421, 1436-1437, 1451). As between the Plaintiffs and we 
drywall subcontractor and supplier, Western and Bailey, aL 
issues submitted to the jury were similarly determined 
in favor of the Plaintiffs, resulting in a judgment of 
no cause of action, and Lignell-Todd were likewise awarded 
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their costsS (R. Cl421) . I b th n o those cases, if attorney's 
fees were to have been awardable, they must necessarily have 
been awarded to the Plaintiffs, not against them. Since 
Title 14 (erroneously called "Chapter 14" by the court) 
provides, where applicable, that attorney's fees "shall 
be taxed as costs in the action," the intent of the stat-
ute would appear to preclude taxing the Comstock-Murray-
Western-Bailey attorney's fees, amounting to some $32,000.00, 
against Lignell and Todd, the prevailing party to whom costs 
had been awarded as an adjunct to their judgments of "no 
cause. " It further seems clear that, had those "labor and 
rna te rial bond" actions not been con so 1 ida ted with the 
Lignell-Todd suit on the construction contract, the matter 
as to that $32,000.00 of the attorney's fees would have 
been totally and finally foreclosed in each separate action, 
favorably to Lignell and Todd. Plaintiffs submit that the 
mere fact that the cases were consolidated should not 
obligate them to pay the attorney's fees for all parties 
J.nvolved. 
The record is clear that in spite of the consolida-
tion neither the trial court nor the various parties con-
sidered Lignell and Todd to be participants in the suits 
by the subcontractors on the labor and material bonds (T. 
263-264). Nevertheless, in a curious and inexplicable 
Splaintiffs also prevailed on the question of a 
mechanics lien asserted by Western and Bailey thereby 
making Plaintiffs the "successful party" under §38-1-18. 
-49-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
feat of legal gymnastics, the trial court, after properly 
awarding attorney's fees against the bonding company in 
the "contractor's bond" suits, transferred the burden of 
the bonding company's loss to Lignell and Todd in the 
Memorandum Decision by simply adding the words "who in tun 
are entitled to recover a like amount from Plaintiffs 
Lignell and Todd." This despite the fact that no legal 
theory for such a pass-through had ever been pleaded, ~d 
no issues respecting an award over had ever been tried. 
C. The statutory attorney's fees relate only to 
direct claims premised on a labor and material bond. The 
subject statute, §14-2 et seq., was enacted to protect 
subcontractors, laborers and materialmen. Crane Company 
v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 413, 335 P.2d 837 
(1959); Deluxe Glass Company v. Martin, 116 Utah 144, 208 
P. 2d 1127 (1949). As far as the partnership is concerned 
Plaintiffs brought no bond action of any kind against the[; 
theirs was a contract action. Plaintiffs did sue surety 
on the performance bond, but that can in no way be construi 
to be an action on the labor and material bond, further, 
surety cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be deeme: 
to be a "subcontractor or a materialman." 
Section 14-2-1, "Action on bond to protect rnechan· 
ics and rna terialmen," requires an owner to obtain from a 
contractor a bond equal to the contract price running to 
the owner and others, and provides a direct right of ac· 
tion on the bond against the surety for those who have 
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furnished materials or performed labor. 
Section 14-2-2, provides for direct liability 
against an owner who fails to post the bond. This liability 
is limited, however, to persons who have furnished materials 
or performed labor. 
Section 14-2-3 provides as follows: 
"Action on bond to protect mechanics and 
materlalmen--Attorney's fee.--In any action 
brought upon the bond prov1ded for under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
fixed by the court, which shall be-taxed as 
costs in the action." (emphasis added). 
Combined for trial in this case were: 
(1) The action by subcontractor Western and mat-
erialman Bailey on the Labor and Material Payment Bond, 
and other assorted claims; 
(2) The action by subcontractors Murray and 
Comstock on the Labor and Material Payment Bond; and other 
claims not within the provisions of the bonding statute; 
and, 
(3) The action by Lignell and Todd on the construe-
tion contract as to the Defendant joint venture and the 
performance bond as to Fidelity, the bonding company. 
The only actions "brought upon the bond provided 
for under this chapter [Chapter 14-2]" were portion of (1) 
and (2) next above. Hence, they are the only actions to 
which §14-2-3 can, by its very terms, have any application. 
Action (3) above was on the performance bond purchased by 
the owners for their own protection. This is not a "bond 
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provided for under this chapter. " 
Western, Bailey, Comstock and Murray were the 
"successful party" as the term is used in §14-2-3 against 
Berg Construction and Fidelity, and properly recovered 
attorney's fees. In those actions, the ones to which 
§14-2-3 applies, Lignell and Todd were the "successful 
parties" as noted above, adjudged such and awarded costs. 
Clearly there is no statutory basis for an award of fees 
against them. No contract or tort basis was even claimed 
by the contractor or surety. It follows that the award of 
attorney's fees against Todd and Lignell was erroneous ~d 
should be set aside. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in 
this award in a number of respects, to-wit: 
(a) No award of any kind should have been made 
to the partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Company, 
for the reasons set forth in Point II above, since that 
entity was not a party to any contract with the Plaintiffs 
and should not have been permitted any standing in the sui· 
(b) There was no contract between Plaintiffs ~d 
any of the Defendants providing for the award of attorney'' 
fees. Although lack of such a contract would be immateria 
to the award of attorney's fees to a subcontractor against 
the bonding company under §14-2-3, it would be necessary 
to show that such a contract existed between the suretY 
and the owners in order to charge those fees over against 
Lignell and Todd. 
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(c) The trial court erred in ruling that the 
provisions of Chapter (sic] 14, U.C.A., authorize an award 
of attorney's fees between the contractor and the owners 
and the surety and the owners. While Section 14-2-3 per-
mits an award of attorney's fees between the subcontractors 
and the bonding company in cases where a bond has been 
posted, where, as here, the owners have actually furnished 
the bond required by §14-2-1, they have met their entire 
burden and the bond is exculpatory as to them. 
(d) Section 14-2-3 only provides for an award of 
attorney's fees in an action brought upon a bond to protect 
mechanics and materialmen. No such action was brought by 
or against Plaintiffs. 
(e) Even if the contentions in (a), (b), (c) and 
(d) above were decided by this Court against the Plaintiffs, 
there would still be no legal basis for awarding judgment 
against Plaintiffs for the attorney's fees awarded to the 
subcontractors against the contractor and bonding company 
under §14-2-3. 
(f) §14-2-3 provides, where applicable, for 
attorney's fees to be taxed as costs. As previously noted, 
Plaintiffs were awarded their costs against the electrical 
subcontractor and the drywall subcontractor and supplier, 
and this precludes assessing the subcontractors' $32,000.00 
in attorney's fees over against Lignell and Todd. 
(g) The Labor and Material Payment Bond with the 
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joint venture as principal and the bonding company as sur 
provided with respect to suits by unpaid subcontractors 
and materialmen that the owner (Plaintiffs Lignell and To: 
would not be liable for the payment of any costs or ex-
penses of any such suit. Plaintiffs are entitled to the 
benefit of that bond provision as a duly enforceable con· 
tract covenant (See sub-point E of this Point III). The 
Labor and Material Bond containing that provision was 
found to have been properly executed and delivered (See 
sub-point D of this Point III). 
D. Plaintiffs posted the necessary bond and 
should have been exonerated from liability. The rationalE 
of the trial court is clear from its Memorandum Decision, 
but represents a lack of precision of analysis and an ~­
warranted expansion of the reach of Chapter 14-2 that 
would, if affirmed by this Court, furnish a whole new fiei 
for the recovery of attorney's fees in construction cases. 
The trial court awarded the subcontractors' , the contrac· 
tor's and the bonding company's attorney's fees against 
an Owner who had complied with Chapter 14-2 and had 
furnished a full, valid and sufficient bond. There is 
no precedent for such a result. The rule in this state 
is that once an owner furnishes the bond required by 
Chapter 14-2, he is exonerated from liability. That such 
is the law in Utah is made clear by the holding in two 
cases dealing with this statute. 
In Deluxe Glass Company v. Martin, supra, tried 
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by Judge Ellett, the surety defended claiming that unpaid 
materialmen could not recover directly against it. Sec-
tions 17-2-1 and 17-2-2, U.C.A., 1943, the statutes in-
volved, were the same as the present §§14-2-1 and 14-2-2. 
A bond had been provided by the owner which the bonding 
company claimed to be inadequate to meet the requirements 
of §17-2-1. The court held against the bonding company. 
In reaching its decision this Court dealt with the effect 
of an owner furnishing the bond required by the statute. 
The salient portion reads as follows: 
"We have hereinabove discussed the sufficiency 
of the bond as a common law obligation to sus-
tain the right of the mater~almen to sue. It 
is also sufficient under the statute· to exonerate 
the owner of l~ab~lity. Title 17 of our stat-
utes was enacted for the protection of laborers 
and materialmen. Liberty Coal & Lumber Co. 
v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 P. 341, and Bamberger 
co. v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Utah 
194, 48 P.2d 489. By its prov~sions, they, on 
default of the contractor, are given recourse, 
in the alternative, against the owner o1· the 
sureties on the contractor's bond." (emphasis 
added). Id. at 1132. 
The alternative referred to is an action (1) against the 
owner if he fails to post the bond or (2) against the surety 
if the owner does post the bond. 
In Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299 P.2d 837, 
(1956), this court held an owner who failed to post the bond 
liable to an unlicensed subcontractor and stated (at page 
838) : 
"This is particularly true when we consider 
the fact that the owner could have avoided any 
personal obligation ha~ he hims7lf complied with 
Section 14-2-1, supra. (emphas~s added) 
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That Plaintiff owners, Lignell and Todd, furnished a valic 
and sufficient bond is undisputed. Finding No. 8 at ~ 
Cl412, reads: 
"8. Berg Construction Company as Principal 
and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland as 
Surety executed and delivered a Labor and 
Material Payment Bond and a Performance Bond 
at the request of the owners of the Incline 
Terrace and in compliance with Chapter 2 of 
Title 14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Said 
bond is dated February 16, 1972, and is in the 
face amount of $1,351,755.00." 
It follows that Lignell and Todd were exonerated from lia· 
bili ty to Murray-Comstock-Western and Bailey. There is nc 
exception to the exoneration rule for attorney's fees ~d 
the Legislature has not provided for any round-about route 
to the owners' pocketbook through the contractor or suret1 
E. Surety contracted with Plaintiffs that they 
would not be liable for any costs relative to suits on 
the material bond. Not only does the Utah law exonerate 
the Plaintiffs from liability for the attorney's fees, 
but, in addition thereto, the bonding company ("Fidelity' 
in the Memorandum Decision) specifically contracted with 
the Plaintiffs that they would not be liable for any oft 
costs or expenses of any suits brought by subcontractors 
on that particular bond. The Labor and Material Payment 
Bond (2nd page of Ex. 18) contains the following provisio" 
"The above named Principal [Berg Construction 
Co.] and Surety [Fidelity] hereby jointly and 
severally agree with the Owner [Lignell and 
Todd] that every claimant as herein defined,_ 
who has not been paid in full before the expHa· 
tion of a period of ninety (90) days after the 
date on which the last of such claimant's work 
or labor was done or performed, or materials 
-
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werefurnished by such claimant, may sue on 
this bond for the use of such claimant 
prosecute the suit to final judgment f~r 
such sum or sums as may be justly due claim-
ant, and have execution thereon. The owner 
shall not be liable for the payment of any 
cost~ or expenses of any such suit." (Em-
phas~s & bracketed material added.) 
Certainly one of the costs or expenses that must have been 
contemplated by the parties at that time was attorney's 
fees. 
F. Consolidation of the actions should not make 
Plaintiffs responsible for all parties' attorney's fees. 
The Defendants argued, and the court evidently held, that 
since the actions were combined, everyone in them became 
parties to "an action brought upon the bond provided for 
under this chapter," thereby making Lignell and Todd liable 
for the attorney's fees of all the parties involved. Plain-
tiffs submit that consolidation for trial does not alter 
the substantive rights of the parties to the consolidated 
actions. If the court's ruling on attorney's fees were 
to be sustained, a new and substantial substantive change 
would occur in the rights of anyone whose action was con-
solidated for trial with a labor or material claim being 
pursued under a Chapter 14-2 bond. Such person, dragged 
against his will into other multiple suits, would run the 
risk of having to pay the attorney's fees of all parties, 
those he succeeds against, those he loses to and anyone 
else "in the action." Only the Legislature should have 
the power to thus expand the effect of a statutory bonding 
provision. It has not yet seen fit to do so. 
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G. The trial on the subcontractor's bond was 
a sham. Plaintiffs submit that the only reason Defendant 
surety required the subcontractors to go through the 
lengthy trial was so that they, in concert with surety 
and the partnership, could marshal, their forces against 
Lignell and Todd and prevail by sheer weight of numbers 
and the creation of mass confusion. To require the elec· 
tricians and the drywallers to participate in the trial 
against Lignell and Todd apparently was one of the main 
elements of surety's trial strategy. From early in ~e 
development of this case, surety took the position that it 
had no dispute with the claims made by the different 
subcontractors and that any claim they made would not ~ 
contested. Defendant surety also admitted, both prior to 
and at the time of trial, that the Labor and Material 
Payment Bond was binding upon it and valid as to the 
subject subcontractors and that it would pay the legitimat 
claims of Murray, Comstock, Western Drywall and Claron 
Bailey (T. 262, 303). The fact that there was no serious 
contention regarding surety's attitude towards the claims 
of the subcontractors was demonstrated throughout the 
trial by the conduct of Mr. Nebeker, counsel for 
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surety. 6 The d 1 recor c early shows that both Defendants 
did little, if any, cross-examination of the subcontractors' 
witnesses and called no witnesses in their own behalf. 
Even had the surety put up a legitimate defense 
to the claims of the subcontractors, the award of attorney's 
fees against Lignell and Todd would have been error. But 
based upon the performance of surety, vis-a-vis the sub-
contractors, there can be no question that the subcontrac-
tors' portion of the trial was solely for the benefit of 
surety and the Bergs. 
That the Plaintiffs should be required by the trial 
court to pay for something that was designed and arches-
trated solely by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland 
for its benefit is contrary to justice. 
6Nebeker assisted the subcontractors and their 
counsel in presenting their claims and offered absolutely 
no resistance thereto. On many occasions Mr. Nebeker 
lodged objections to questions by counsel for Lignell 
and Todd seeking to establish that the workmanship of 
the various subcontractors was defective. Particularly, 
Mr. Nebeker became actively involved when Mr. Bateman 
was attempting to establish, among other things, that 
some of the electricians' charges for extras were exces-
sive and that the work had not been done in accor-
dance with the National Electric Code. On various 
occasions questions were posep to Mr. Bateman to which 
counsel for the electricians did not object, but to 
which Mr. Nebeker did object, although the questions 
went to the issue of the quality of the work done and 
the proper charges therefor, and thus would logically 
have been in the best interest of Mr. Nebeker and his 
client (T. 935-61 to 935-69; 935-72 to 935-76). On one 
occasion Mr. Nebeker even objected to Plaintiffs evidence 
that dealt solely with issues between the subcontractors 
and the owners and was not related in any way to any 
claims against his client (T. 935-66). 
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Point IV 
THE Al'i'ARD OF INTEREST BY THE TRIAL COURT TO THE 
PARTNERSHIP AND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AFTER THE JURY VEHDIC!' 
WERE RETURNED WAS IMPROPER. 
A. The only issue reserved by the trial court~ 
attorney's fees. On July 16, 1976, a pre-trial conferenc, 
was held wherein various motions were presented. All of 
the parties to the consolidated case were represented by 
their counsel. One of the issues dealt with at that time 
concerned the claims of the surety and the partnership to 
an award of attorney's fees. During the hearing on that 
is sue, Mr. Nebeker, counsel for the surety, suggested that 
the court ask for briefs on the subject of "attorney's fee 
and costs on contractor's bonds." (Supp. T. 44) . In resp1 
to Mr. Nebeker's suggestion, the court stated: 
"It is obvious to the Court maybe some of 
this matter will resolve itself at the time of 
the trial. If it's a matter the Court will 
have to rule on anyway I'll reserve my ruling 
on the motion and anyone that desires to may 
present any authorities to support their posi-
tion." (Supp. T. 45-47) (emphasis added). 
In attempting to clarify the state of the proceed: 
Mr. Tanner inquired of the court whether or not that aspe: 
of the case was to be tried by the court after the jury 
trial (Supp T. 47). In response thereto, the following 
dialogue took place: 
"THE COURT: I thought that's what we had and thi: 
would be the only way to approach it 
Hr. Tanner. 
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.1-1R · TANNER: I would too. I do not recall we had 
determined that. 
THE COURT: It was mentioned here by Mr. Nebeker 
and maybe we hadn't determined it. 
Hy ruling contemplated that I had no 
intention of permitting that matter 
to be presented to the jury. 
MR. TANNER: Thank you, your Honor, I just wanted 
to settle that." 
THE COURT: That's the reason I prefaced my re-
marks by saying that this is a matter 
the Court would have to handle at 
that time anyway and dependent upon 
the outcome of the case it would deter-
mine which side would be entitled to 
prove any attorney's fees anyway. 
That should be reserved as a matter of 
law." (Supp. T. 47-48) (emphasis added). 
From the above, Plaintiff submits that the record 
is clear that the trial court reserved only the issue of 
attorney's fees for a determination after the jury verdict. 
Further evidence of this fact is clearly disclosed by other 
portions of the record. 
While discussing the Plaintiff's Motion for a Direct-
ed Verdict upon the discovery of the evidence that neither 
the joint venture nor the partnership had a proper con-
tractor's license, the court stated that it had gone back 
and reviewed its notes of the July 16th hearing and that it 
remembered reserving the matter of attorney's fees (T. 1392). 
It is important to note that the trial court made no ref-
erence at all to the reservation of the issue of interest. 
On September 24, 1976, in relation to another motion, the 
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court again stated with reference to the pre-trial on JuJ: 
16th: 
"In connection with your motion earlier in 
Chambers talking about the Court having under 
advisement a motion to dismiss, that had to do 
only with the attorney's fees, did it not?" 
(T. 3240) (emphasis added). 
The court further stated that the matter of attorney's ~ 
was left until after the time of trial according to its 
notes (T. 3240). There then ensued a discussion as to ~r 
exactly had transpired at that prior hearing in relation t 
other subjects and the court declared, ""t-~Jell, I' 11 stand 
on what the record may say. I think the reporter made a 
record and I would be surprised if it's anything different 
than I have just read you."7 The discussion continu~ 
and the court then stated: 
"Can we all agree on this, Mr. Tanner, 
that's the only subject matter topic at all 
that was reserved until trial was attorney's 
fees and had nothing to do about affirmative 
defenses or anything of that nature?" (T. 
3241) (emphasis added). 
At that time, counsel for both the surety and joint ventu: 
were present and participated in the discussion. 
B. The Findings of the court relating to inter~ 
are not supported by the record. On October 12, 1976, aft 
the jury had been dismissed, counsel for surety filed a 
notice of a hearing wherein it was indicated for the f~~ 
7The complete record of that portion of the heart 
is found in Supp. Trans. 36-48. 
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time that the matter of interest would be determined by the 
'court (R. Cl352-1353). A hearing was held on that matter 
at which time plaintiffs timely raised their objection to 
any award of interest by the court (R. Cl389). The court 
erroneously concluded that it had reserved the issue of in-
terest until after trial (R. Cl396) and thereafter, awarded 
interest to surety and the partnership and signed Findings 
of Fact and a Judgment relating thereto prepared by surety 
(R. Cl409-1417). Plaintiffs submit that the record is 
wholly lacking of any mention of the reservation of the 
matter of interest until long after the judgments were en-
tered, that the issues deterrninat1ve of ent~ement to in-
terest were submitted to the jury, and that the entry of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating thereto 
was erroneous and unlawful in light of the record. As a 
consequence, the Findings of Fact must be set aside and the 
award of interest based thereon must be reversed. 
C. The jury considered and rejected an award of 
interest. The jury brought in a verdict for the partner-
ship, as if the partnership were the contractor. As is 
clear from the Instructions, the counterclaim was premised 
on the Construction Agreement (Ex. 9) as supplemented 
by the Addendum and certain extras. That agreement pro-
vided for certain conditions to be met before the contractor 
was entitled to receive the final 10%. With the Addendum, 
the fixed price contract was for $1,759,003.00. Ten percent 
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---
thereof is $175,900.00. The sum awarded counterclaimant 
was $159,801.99, which is less than the amount of the t1· r. 
10%. 
The exact wording of the Construction Agreement o: 
this point is: 
'"rhe final 10% will be disbursed when the 
improvements are completed to Pacific Hutual's 
satisfaction and are free and clear of liens or 
claims which might result in liens. Each dis-
bursement must be evidenced by an architect's 
and/or engineer's statement certifying as to 
compliance with plans and specifications ap-
proved by Pacific Mutual, Uniform Building Co~, 
and as to the state of completion of the various 
subcontracts, such certificate to be on form 
approved or furnished by Pacific Mutual. In 
addition, a condition of any disbursement Will 
be compliance with all title company or other 
requirements imposed so that A.L.T.A. policy of 
title insurance rna be issued without exception 
to mechanics' and mater~almen' s l~ens. 11 Ex. 9, 
p. 3) (emphasis added). 
The Plaintiff owners contended that the contractor never: 
the condition for its final draw and presented evidence t1 
that effect (T. 1672-1676-A). The testimony was that of 
Hr. Ellertson, president of Title Insurance Agency, and 
there was no evidence contrary to his testimony adduc.:eil v: 
anyone. He said: 
IIQ. Mr. Ellertson, at the time this closing was 
being prepared for, was the Incline Terra7e 
project in condition that an A.L.T.A. poll~ 
of title insurance could be issued by your 
firm or its correspondents without exceptlon 
to Mechanic's and Material Men Liens? 
A. It was not. 11 (T. 1673, lines 12-17). 
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He further testified that the property was not free and clear 
of liens and lienable claims at the time of closing (February 
1974), and that the closing was only possible because the 
owners furnished some $115,000.00 and posted a $42,000.00 
bond. In short, the contractor never met the condition for 
payment of the final 10% and the owners did those things 
necessary to close and avoid losing the project. The record 
is clear and without dispute that the contractor was not 
entitled to its last 10% in February of 1974. However, 
the court ignored this facet of the record, and it became 
lost in the complex and confusing maze created by the con-
solidation of the cases. 
Nonetheless, the jury had before it the issue of 
the amount of counterclaimant's recovery, including the 
issue of whether anything due was due as of February 1974, 
or as of the time of their verdict. Their verdict was for 
the exact amount shown by Ex. 252, necessarily implying 
that they found the condition precedent to the owners' 
e>UI~a-1\c,n for the final 10% had not been met and that in-
terest was not due for the period prior to the verdict. 
This is even a stronger case than that which was before 
this Court in Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Ut.2d 89, 348 P.2d 931 
(1960), where this court held: 
"The jury verdict represents the money 
owed defendant at the time of the verdict. 
Whether the jury included interest in their 
verdict cannot be determined but there is 
indication that they did consider it because 
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it ~as cla~med in plaintiff's complaint, and 
thelr verdlct, from the indications in the 
record, represents what the defendant owed 
the plaintiff at that time." 
Point V 
THE JUDGMENT OF BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPAN! 
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE A VALID CONTRACT· 
OR'S LICENSE. 
Our statutes provide that: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, 
co-partnership, corporation, association or 
other organization, or any combination of any 
thereof, to engage in the business or act in 
the capacity of contractor within this state 
without having a license therefor ... " 
§58-23-l. 
It is uncontroverted that the contracting party, the join! 
venture, did not have a valid contractor's license issued 
by the State of Utah and, in fact, had never made an appl: 
cation for such a license (T. 3048).8 Although the tril 
court refused to allow plaintiffs to present evidence of 
lack of license to the jury, the evidence established~ 
trial, outside the presence of the jury, showed that the 
partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Company, also was 
not licensed at any time relevant to this cause (T. 3045· 
8 An individual license was issued by the Depar~ 
of Contractors to Berg Construction Company but this. was 1 
name under which the individual, Frank Berg, did buslnes:· 
That license was first issued in 1940 (T. 3050). This, 1 
ever, is not the equivalent of a license to the joint vent 
which also did business under the name of Berg Constructll 
Company (T. 3048, 3068). 
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3047, 3049) and the trial court so found (T. 1688). As a 
result, neither the partnership, nor the joint venture 
would be entitled to recover under the laws of this state. 
Meridian Corporation v. !1cGlynn/Garmaker Co., 567 P.2d 1110 
(Utah 1977). 
The uncontroverted evidence in this matter shows 
that prior to trial, Plaintiffs' attorneys made inquiries 
to the Department of Contractors concerning the existence of 
contractor's licenses for Mr. Clifford Berg, for Berg Bro-
thers Construction Company and for Berg Construction Company. 
They were informed that Berg Brothers Construction Company 
was properly licensed and that the license had originally 
been issued in 1969; but that the files were out of their 
place and unavailable for examination (R. C992-999, 1365-
1369). As the trial drew near, Plaintiffs' counsel made 
additional attempts to verify the status of the contractor's 
license, but were prevented from doing so either by the 
actions of employees of the Department of Business Regula-
tion, Contractors Division, or by the absence of the files 
relating thereto from their normal place in that Department 
(R. C992-994). On September 1, 1976, Plaintiffs finally 
gained access to the records of the Department and ascer-
tained at that time that there was, in fact, no contractor's 
license in existence at the times critical to this suit. 
Plaintiffs thereupon immediately notified opposing counsel 
and moved for a directed verdict based on this lack of 
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licensing. This was done between the first and the se cone 
days of the trial of the owners' suit against the contract 
and after the close of the electricians' case in chief. 
Mr. Robert Frome, director of the Contractors Divi 
sian, testified that his records indicated that the part• 
ship, Berg Brothers Construction Company, was originally 
licensed on December 11, 1969, but that its license lapsed 
on April 30, 1971. Thereafter, the partnership was unli· 
censed throughout the remainder of 1971, all of 1972 and 
1973. Mr. Frome testified that a license was issued in Ju. 
1974 but was different from the one that had previously be 
issued to the partnership; it contained a different n~r 
had a different bid limit and was a Class "B-1, labor onl1 
license, while the original license had been a Class "B" 
license. 
It was uncontroverted that the partnership neither 
alleged in any of its pleadings that it was, in fact, pro; 
erly licensed, nor sought to cure that defect by amendment 
(T. 1390). Further, it is uncontroverted that as a resul: 
of the partnership's failure to plead a license, Plaintifi 
as their first defense in their Reply to the Counterclaim, 
alleged that the counterclaim failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief could be granted (R. C962-964, 
R. A38-40). Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that 
"lack of license" is an affirmative defense under Rule B[l 
and that Plaintiffs' failure to so plead before trial ~r 
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stituted a waiver under Rule 12(h) (T. 1687, R. Cl395-
1396). This is error requiring a reversal of counterclaim-
ant's judgment. 
A. A contractor must prove, as an element of his 
prima facie case, that he held a valid Utah Contractor's 
license when he entered into the construction contract. 
It is the clear law of this state that the failure to obtain 
a license which is required by a statute enacted for the 
safety and protection of the citizens of the state is fatal 
to a claim for affirmative relief in our courts. Meridian 
Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra; Mosley v. Johnson, 22 
Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149 (1969); Lyman v. Taylor, 14 Utah 
2d 362, 384 P.2d 407 (1963); Eklund v. Elwell, 116 Utah 521, 
P.2d 849 (1949); Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 
(1948); Smith v. American Packing and Provision Co., 102 
Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942). This rule.of law was 
reaffirmed by this Court on July 29th of this year. Meridian 
Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra. 
There is no doubt that the license required by Sec-
tion 58-23-1 is for the protection of the citizens of the 
State of utah (Meridian v. McGlynn/Garrnaker Co., supra; 
Olsen v. Reese, supra), and that the partnership was required 
to have such a license. 
B. The trial court improperly placed upon the owners 
the burden of ascertaining the existence or non-existence of 
the required license. Although the established rule in this 
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state is that in order for a contractor to recover upona 
contract it is necessary for him, as part of his case ~ 
chief, to allege and prove that he was a licensed contract 
at the time the contract was entered into, Meridian Corp, 
v. HcGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra; Olsen v. Reese, supra; Ek· 
lund v. Elwell, supra, the trial court took the position 
that the contractor had no duty to even allege, let alo~ 
prove, the existence of a valid license, rather that t~ 
burden was upon the owners to negate that proposition. TL 
precise position, however, was rejected by this Court as 
early as 1942 in the case of Smith v. American Packing anc 
Provision Co., supra. Therein this Court stated: 
"Appellant contends that all of the matters 
raised by defendant constitute matters of de-
fense which plaintiff does not have to negative. 
However, the general rule is that where a person 
seeks recovery for professional services for 
which a license is required as a condition pre-
cedent to the rendition of such services for a 
fee, such person must allege and prove facts, 
which show he was licensed at the time such 
services were performed or that he was exempted 
from the class required to have such license 
. . . The facts as to license and qualifica-
tions for performing professional services are 
almost without exception better known to the 
person holdincr such a license than to the other 
party. It might be extremely difficult for a 
person defending an action based on alleged 
professional services to negative the existence 
of a license or show that claimant does not 
come within the exceptions of the statute." 
(emphasis added) . 
The very problems envisioned by this Court in the 
Smith case were, in fact, realized in the instant case. 
facts as to the existence or non-existence of the require; 
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license were clearly better known to the partnership. In 
fact, Mr. Berg knew as early as July 24, 1974, that Berg 
Brothers Construction Company had not been properly licensed 
during the period in question (Ex. 242). Nevertheless, that 
unlicensed partnership proceeded to file the Counterclaim 
in the instant action, omitting therefrom, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, an allegation that it was prop-
erly licensed as required by law (R. A21-27, T. 1390). As 
set forth in the affidavits of counsel for Plaintiffs, a 
diligent effort was made on Plaintiffs' behalf to determine 
whether or not Berg Brothers Construction Company was indeed 
properly licensed but in spite of this effort, they were 
unable to verify that Berg Brothers Construction Company 
was in fact not licensed until after the consolidated trial 
had commenced. In spite of the fact that Plaintiffs were 
prevented from obtaining the necessary information, and 
further in spite of the fact that Berg, the managing partner 
of the partnership, had known for over two years that the 
partnership had no license, the trial court erroneously 
placed upon the owners the burden of proving the non-existence 
of the contractor's license. 
Although, in Plaintiffs' view, the case of Smith v. 
American Packing and Provision is clear, if any doubt re-
mained as to who had the burden of proof regarding licensing, 
that matter was disposed of in 1949 in the case of Eklund v. 
Elwell, supra. In that case, a contractor was denied 
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recovery on his contract because he was not properly licen. 
In a concurring opinion Justice Wolfe stated, at page 840: 
"I concur in the results. I have had a 
lingering doubt as to the correctness of our 
holding that a plaintiff in a licensed busi-
ness is required to plead that at the time 
of the making of the contract, he was licensed 
to do the business in pursuance of which the 
contract was made. Each time the question 
comes up there is renewed in my mind the ques-
tion of whether it should not be pleaded as a 
defense, but I bow to the law already laid 
down in that respect in this jurisdiction." 
(emphasis added) 
This Court has recently again affirmed the proposi 
set forth in Smith v. American Packing and Provision Co. t 
it is necessary for a party seeking to recover where a lie 
is required to allege that he had the license in order to 
state a cause of action. Meridian Corp. v McGlynn/Garrnake: 
Co., supra. Thus, for the trial court to shift this burdf 
to the owners was clearly an error. Since the record esta 
lishes beyond question that neither the partnership nortl 
joint venture was licensed, the proper remedy is to rever: 
the judgment on the counterclaim. 
C. The trial court erred in refusing to admit e~ 
ence that the counterclaimant had no contractor 1 s licen2!.· 
After shifting to Plaintiffs the burden of disproving the 
existence of the contractor 1 s license, the court then rul< 
that Plaintiffs had waived the right to raise that defense 
under Rule 8 (c), U.R.C.P., and refused to allow Plaintiffs 
to present any evidence to the jury on that point. Rule! 
enumerates 19 affirmative defenses which must be alleged· 
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One of those enumerated defenses is "license". The court 
erroneously concluded that the use of the term "license" 
meant that the owners had to prove "lack of license". It 
is submitted, however, that the term "license" is not synon-
9 ymous with the term "1 ack of 1 icense" . 
In the first instance "license", if it had anything 
at all to do with such things as a contractor's license, 
would normally be interpreted to mean that the proponent of 
the proposition must establish that he had a license. The 
only occasions when having a "license" would constitute a 
defense would be in an administrative or court procedure 
alleging that a contractor lacked a license or is practicing 
without a license. In such cases "license" would be a de-
fense. 
In a case based upon a construction contract--or 
for a broker's fee or attaney's fee or medical fee, etc., 
the defense to the claim that money is due would be "lack 
of license". "License" is not a defense at all, let alone 
an affirmative defense in cases involving regulated occupa-
tions requiring licensing under the state law. 
The use of the defense "license" had its derivation 
as a defense or plea of justification to an action in tres-
pass, Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed., "license" P· 
1068, and, as used in Rule 8(c), is synonymous with "consent". 
Cone v. Iverson, 4 ~~- 203, 35 P.2d 1933 (1893). The defense 
9Plaintiffs submit that Rule 8(c) simila7lY do~s ~ot 
require a party to plead "lack of accord and sat~sfact~on , 
"lack of duress", "lack of waiver", etc. 
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of license appears in actions for trespass, Raser v. QualL 
-4 Blackf. 286 (Ind. 1837); Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 llB: 
Shiffman v. Hickey, 101 Or. 596, 200 P. 1035 (1921); and conve: 
Cone v. Iverson, supra. In each of the cited cases, plain· 
tiff complained of an act on the part of defendant, and de· 
fendant answered by admitting that although he had done the 
act complained of it was done with the "license" or "conse: 
of plaintiff. As used in Rule 8 (c), "license" does not meo 
a physical document but, rather, refers to the prior appro·. 
to do some act; therefore, that term is not synonymous wit: 
"lack of license" as applied by the trial court. 
By construing the term "license" to include the ter 
"lack of license", the trial court required Plaintiffs~ 
assume a portion of the partnership's affirmative case and 
shifted the burden on that issue to plaintiffs, which is 
contrary to the law of this state, Meridian Corp. v. MeG!; 
Garmaker Co. , supra; Smith v. American Packing and Provisi: 
Co., supra, and contrary to the provision, purpose and sec: 
of the rules of procedure. 
The court went even further in reallocating burden 
of pleading and proof. In the instant case the sole con· 
tractor defendant, the joint venture, had not even countet 
claimed. No one but the defendant may counterclaim. None· 
theless, despite the fact that the defendant joint venturi 
had made no claim of any kind, the trial court held that 
Plaintiffs were required under Rule 8 (c) to allege as an 
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affirmative defense that one of the constituent parties to 
the joint venture lacked a license (T. 2565) , and further 
held that Plaintiffs' failure to so allege prior to trial 
barred them forever from showing that the interloping joint 
venturer was unlicensed. The court did not elaborate on 
the procedures that Plaintiffs should have employed, but one 
must assume that the trial court was of the opinion that 
Plaintiffs should either have included this "affirmative 
defense" in their Complaint, or should, at the time the 
non-defendant volunteered to interpose a claim, have filed 
some additional pleading wherein the "affirmative defense" 
was set forth. 
D. The trial court erroneously concluded that the 
1950 adoption of the Rules of Procedure shifted the licens-
ing burden to Plaintiffs. The trial court was of the erron-
eous opinion that the duty to allege and prove the existence 
of a contractor's license was procedural, rather than sub-
stantive, and that it had been changed by the adoption of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 1950. This clearly is 
not the case. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted 
by this Court pursuant to the authority given to it by Sec-
tion 78-2-4. Therein it is provided that this Court 
has the power to prescribe, alter and revise the rules of 
practice and procedure in all civil actions. That statute, 
however, has a clearly stated limitation of particular sig-
nificance to this case. It provides that such rules "may 
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not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of , 
a,, 
litigant. nlO 
There can be little doubt that the rules deterrn~~ 
the elements needed to constitute a cause of action are 5~ 
stanti ve in nature. As has been stated, "the elements of 
plaintiff's prima facie case are determined by applicable 
substantive law," 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice, ,18.27[4], 
p. 1858. 
"It is a matter of substantive law whether certain 
elements do or do not constitute a part of the plaintiffs' 
prima facie case." 2A J. Moore, supra, ,18.27(2], p. 1843. 
See also, U.S. For the Use and Benefit of Greenville Equip· 
ment Co. v. U.S. Cas. Co., 278 F. Supp. 653 (D. Del. 1962). 
There can be no doubt that under the clear mandate 
of our Legislature, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure did 
not change the components of any cause of action known to 
the law at the time the rules were adopted. What was a ne1 
sary element in order to recover under code pleading is st: 
a necessary element under notice pleading. Cf. Meridian C: 
v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra. 
Of special interest on this subject is the caseof 
Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard, 231 Ga. 26, 190 S.E. 2d 
10The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopte: 
pursuant to a similar mandate; Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sectior. 
2072 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ar: 
to regulate only "practice and procedure" and are not to 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. see , 
Sibbach v. Wilson and Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Mississi~ 
Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 
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899 (1973), decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia after 
the adoption by it of their Rules of Practice which are com-
parable to our Rules of Civil Procedure.ll In that case, 
the Supreme Court of Georgia was faced with a situation 
similar to the one presented here. An unlicensed employment 
agency was attempting to recover a fee in the face of a 
regulatory statute requiring a license. The courts 
of Georgia had long ago determined, as this Court has, that 
proof of a valid, regulatory license was a prerequisite to 
recovery for such a claim. The issue presented was, as here, 
the effect of the adoption of the rules of procedure upon 
the established substantive law of the state. The court 
there resolved the precise issue here in question when it 
held that "lack of license" was not a defense that must be 
raised by the opposing party. This holding was under the 
very language that the trial court in the instant case was 
required to interpret when it held that Plaintiffs had the 
burden under Rule 8(c) of pleading and proving "lack of 
license" as an affirmative defense. The Georgia court spec-
11Georgia in 1966 enacted the Civil Procedures Act, 
which is comparable to both the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 81A-108(c) 
of that Act deals with affirmative defenses and is almost 
identical to our Rule S(c). It states: 
"Affirmative defenses - In a pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party ~hall ~et fort~ 
affirmatively accord and sat~sfact~on, arb~tra­
tion and award, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, il~ 
legality injury by fellow servant, laches, 1~­
cense, p~yment, release, res judicata, st~tute 
of frauds, statute of limitations, and wa~ver .. 
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ifically held that adopting the rules of procedure did not 
alter the substantive burden of proving a valid license as 
part of the case in chief, precisely the position reaffirmed 
by the Supreme Court of Utah in Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn; 
Garmaker Co., supra. 
E. The counterclaimant's action should have been 
dismissed for failure to plead or prove that it was a licen1 
contractor. Since the partnership's counterclaim must be 
vested with all the prerequisites of a complaint, State by 
and Through Road Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, .3~$ f.i 
585 (1962), the partnership's failure to state a prima f£~ 
cause obviated the necessity of defendant pleading any affi: 
mative defense. Indeed, an affirmative defense only goes 
to those facts which the plaintiff, or in this case the 
counterclaimant, is not bound to prove. West Nichols Hills 
Presbyterian Church v. Folks, 276 P.2d 255 (Okla. 1954). ili 
stating it differently, evidence which contrqverts facts 
necessary. to be proven by the plaintiff need not be pleaded 
by way of affirmative defense but may be shown under a gen· 
eral denial. Elston v. Wagner, 216 Or. 386, 337 P.2d 326 
(1959). This Lignell and Todd did in the instant case~ 
alleging that the Counterclaim failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief can be granted (R. A38-40). ~en 
the licensing issue was raised by Plaintiffs on a motion tc 
dismiss the Counterclaim, that motion should have been grar.: 
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F. The matter of lack of a valid contractor's license 
may be raised at any time in a proceeding in which an un-
licensed contractor seeks to recover for construction work. 
As set forth above the law in Utah is clear that a contractor 
must plead the existence of a license in order to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. Meridian Corp. v. 
McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra. Under the wording of Rule 12, 
the defense of failure to state a claim can be raised at any 
time. Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P., provides that a party waives all 
defenses and objections which he does not present either by 
motion or in his answer or reply except failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, which defense can be 
raised by a later pleading, by a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or at the trial on the merits. It is clear that 
plaintiffs raised the matter of the failure to state a claim 
"at the trial on the merits" as soon as the fact became 
known to them that the partnership was not properly licensed 
(T. 1373-1377). This was clearly permissible under the ex-
press terms of Rule 12. As has been stated: 
"Rule 12(b) (2) provides that a defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted . . . may be made in any pleading 
permitted or ordered under Rule 7(~) or by 
motion for judgment upon the plead~ngs or at 
the trial on the merits. Hence, these substan-
tial defenses are expressly preserved again~t 
waiver under Rule 12(h) (1) or by the operat~on 
of Rule 12(g)." 5 Cyc. Fed. Pro. §1547, p. 
53 (emphasis added). 
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• 
A party may move to dismiss the Complaint after filing his 
answer where the right to make such a motion ;s 
... reserved 01 
incorporated in the answer. 5 eye. Fed. Proc. , supra, SlS:. 
p. 48. Plaintiffs in the instant case made such a resem 
tion in their Reply to the partnership 1 s counterclaims (R •. :. 
40). Plaintiffs promptly moved the trial court during the 
trial to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of license once 
that ir.formation was known to them. That motion was well 
taken. As the court in the Management Search case stated: 
"At whatever stage of the proceedings it 
appears that the plaintiff is seeking to re-
cover upon a contract to be permitted to be 
entered into only by persons holding licenses 
issued as a regulatory measure, it becomes 
imperative for the plaintiff to prove they 
hold such a license and held such a license 
at the time the contract was entered into in 
order to authorize a recovery." Jid. ab 90l·9C'-· 
Thus, once the issue of lack of license came into focus it 
was incumbent upon the partnership to prove the existence 1 
the required license. This it failed to do. 
G. Even if lack of license were an affirmative de· 
fense Plaintiffs should have been allowed to raise that rna: 
by motion under the circumstances of this case. Even ife 
Court should determine that the term "license" as used in 
Rule 8 (c) placed upon Plaintiffs the burden of raising tha: 
matter by way of an affirmative defense. Plaintiffs 1 motio: 
to dismiss, nevertheless, should have been granted. 
An affirmative defense, even though not pleaded,~ 
be raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). As 
-80-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Professor Hoare has stated in his treatise: 
"Rule 8(c) may seem to imply that affir-
mative defenses may be raised only by a pleading 
(where one is required or permitted) and not 
otherwise. This, however, is too na~row of a 
construction of that Rule. A defendant may move 
for summary judgment under Rule 56 where there 
is 'no genuine issue as to any fact' and he 
'is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law'· 
it is clear that summary judgment is proper ' 
where the defendant shows the existence of an 
affirmative defense even though he has filed 
no answer. Under the 1946 amendment to Rule 
12(e), it is also made clear that a defendant 
may raise an affirmative defense by motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim; that the 
Court may treat such a motion as a motion for 
summary judgment • . . By analogizing the motion 
to a motion for summary judgment, however, the 
amended Rule 12(b) clearly permits affirmative 
defenses to be raised by motion. The affirma-
tive defense raised by motion may be handled 
solely under Rule 12(b), without resort to 
summary judgment procedure, where the defense 
appears on the face of the complaint itself. 
And by authorizing the motion under Rule 12(b) 
to be treated as one for summary judgment under 
Rule 56, amended Rule 12(b) clearly permits an 
affirmative defense based on matters outside 
the complaint to be raised by motion." 2A J. 
Moore, supra, ,,8.28, p. 1863-64. 
Further, Professor Moore states: 
"Affirmative defenses may be raised on a 
motion for summary judgment even though not 
pleaded." 6A J. Moore, supra, ,156.17[5], . 
p. 735-741. "There 1s, therefore, no quest1on 
that affirmative defenses may be presented by 
a motion for summary judgment." 2A J. r-toore, 
supra, ~12.09, p. 2295. 
The pleadings in this case clearly indicate that on every 
occasion Plaintiffs preserved their right to challenge the 
sufficiency of the partnership's case by alleging that the 
counterclaims failed to state a cause of action. 
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Pursuant to our Rules and the authorities above cit, 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be 
raised at any time in the proceedings and cannot be waivd e , 
When coupled with affidavits dealing with matters outside t 
pleadings such a motion is to be treated as one for sununary 
judgment. Plaintiffs were, therefore, free to raise their 
motion at anytime. 
Plaintiffs raised the motion of failure to statea 
claim immediately upon obtaining the factual information 
supporting their motion. Plaintiffs 1 motion was supported 
by affidavits that were accepted by the court; therefore, i· 
became a motion for summary judgment under the Rules. Plai 
tiffs 1 motion should have been granted because the uncontrc· 
verted facts showed that the partnership was not entitled 
to recover due to its lack of license. 
H. The trial court erroneously precluded the Plair: 
tiffs' affirmative defense of lack of license. On July 9, 
1976, the partnership served on Plaintiffs an Amended Answe 
and Counterclaim (R. C827-832). The Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim reiterated their defenses to three causes of 
action pled by Plaintiffs, raised the new issue of entitle· 
ment to attorney 1 s fees and, in addition thereto, stated, 
"Defendants incorporate herein all affirmative defenses, 
cross-claims and counterclaims which have previously been 
alleged against the plaintiffs Lignell and Todd." Plainti' 
immediately moved for a dismissal of that portion of the 
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counterclaim relating to attorney's fees but did not file 
a reply responding to the other allegations of the counter-
claim. The trial court, on July 16, 1976, took the motion 
under advisement. 
Although they felt that the trial court's views 
regarding the requirement of alleging lack of license as 
an affirmative defense were in error, Plaintiffs, in addi-
tion to filing a written Motion for Summary Judgment, also 
filed a Reply to the last Amended Counterclaim of the part-
nership setting forth therein as an affirmative defense 
the failure of the partnership to be properly licensed under 
the laws of this state (R. C962-964). The Court permitted 
the reply to be filed (T. 1687), but some 11 days later 
ordered, on its own motion, that the affirmative defense 
relating to lack of license set forth in that Reply be stricken 
(T. 2557). Plaintiffs submit that this clearly was an error 
since there was no motion made by any party to strike any 
portion of Plaintiffs' Reply. See Rule 12(f), U.R.C.P. 
In addition, at the time the Reply was filed, the partner-
ship was some two weeks away from commencing the presenta-
tion of their evidence relating to the Counterclaims. The 
Reply did nothing to change Plaintiffs' theory of its case 
in chief and it did nothing to impact the cases of the sub-
contractors that had previously been concluded in the earlier 
phase of the consolidated matter. Plaintiffs submit 
that they had an absolute right under Rule 7 to file the 
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Reply and that in addition thereto, the court permitted tr 
Reply to be filed without qualification. Absent a motion 
from some other party, the trial court could not thereafte: 
properly strike a portion of that responsive pleading. 
I. Plaintiffs should have been permitted, as a 
minimum, to amend their pleadings. Even had plaintiffs sc. 
to amend rather than file an original pleading, such an 
amendment would have been proper. Under Rule 15, U.R.C.P .. 
amendments to pleadings are to be freely granted when jus· 
tice so .requires. Rule 15 (b) provides that when issues no: 
raised by the pleadings are tried by the parties they shou: 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised ~e 
pleadings. This Court, in Chaney v. Rooker, 4 Utah 2d 201. 
381 P.2d 86 (1963), has indicated clearly that it favors 
liberal amendments to the pleadings so that all the partie: 
are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimat 
contentions may pertain to their dispute. In the insta~ 
case, however, Plaintiffs were prevented from doing that t: 
the trial court. 
The court 1 s failure to allow the Plaintiffs to rai: 
the issue of lack of license under all the facts and eire~ 
stances of this case was clearly prejudicial and, in Plain· 
tiff 1 s view, constituted reversible error for the reasons 
forth above. 
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Point VI 
CONSOLIDATING THE ACTIONS FOR TRIAL MADE THE ISSUES 
AND THE EXHIBITS SO NUMEROUS AND COMPLEX, AND THE TRIAL SO 
LONG AND COMPLICATED AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE OWNERS OF 
A FAIR TRIAL OF THEIR CLAIM AGAINST THE CONTRACTOR AND SURETY. 
On January 15, 1975, upon a motion by the partnership 
and the surety, the Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Sr. consoli-
dated all three cases for the purpose of trial. This was 
done over the objections of Plaintiffs and the drywallers. 
The result was a trial that was inordinately long, unnecessarily 
complex, burdened with many issues that could not be adequately 
dealt with in the context of the consolidated proceedings, and 
caused, in Plaintiffs' view, total confusion on the part of 
the jury, resulting in its inability to adequately review the 
evidence, make the necessary distinctions and render a just 
verdict. 
Any one of the three cases would, by itself, have con-
stituted a full and major effort on the part of counsel if it 
were done properly. But the combination of the three, as the 
12 
size of the record and the number of exhibits reflects, 
created a situation that was totally unmanageable and substan-
tially impaired Plaintiffs' rights to a fair trial in their 
12Two Hundred and Sixty Three exhibits were marked; 
some contained as many as 60 separate parts. The transcript 
is over 3500 pages long. 
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claim against the contractor and the surety. 
A. The different issues and contractual standards 
between the parties made consolidation improper. Consolida· 
is not proper where the parties, the court and the jury are 
burdened with an overcomplication of issues and instruction: 
Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1961), or where it'. 
result in prejudice to any party. United States v. Lusti~, 
16 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). That there was an enormous 
complication of issues and complex and voluminous instructi: 
in the consolidated case cannot be denied (R. Cl039-1109), 
Plaintiffs claim that consolidation was highly prejudici~t 
them. 
Claron Bailey, the materialman, maintained in his 
action that Lignell had acted fraudulently toward him; tie 
jury found in Lignell's favor on that issue. There was no: 
issue between the owners and the contractor and surety. In 
the same vein, the electricians, in their lawsuit, claimed 
that Lignell had made certain oral statements to them which 
Lignell vehemently denied, and again the jury found for Lig· 
nell. These issues were totally unrelated to the Plaintiff: 
claims and no such allegations could have been argued or 
presented to the jury except through the device of combininr 
the actions. Obviously, such claims tend to prejudice the 
jury and weigh heavily on the matter of credibility. Plair· 
tiffs, in their suit against the contractor and surety, sho 
not have been required to deal with the intemperate and 
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accusing remarks of counsel for the subcontractors while the 
jury was weighing the heavy and complex accounting and contract 
issues. The claims challenging Lignell's integrity were pri-
marily a device to permit irrelevant and besmirching testimony 
to be used to improperly appeal to prejudice and sway the jury. 
In short, the tactic was to smear Lignell and broaden the 
impact by the device of consolidating with the owners' suit 
cases containing unfounded, but derogatory allegations, not 
otherwise admissible. This is prejudicial and should warrant 
a new trial free of such improprieties. 
In the consolidated trial, all of the other parties 
combined against the owners, even to the extent that counsel 
for the bonding company and counsel for the contractor assisted 
the drywaller and electricians, alleged that thei~ claims were 
just and helped them maximize the dollar amounts awarded them. 
Thus, Plaintiffs found themselves in the difficult and un-
o-tt 
enviable position of having to point~to the jury that many 
of the claims for extras by the subcontractors were not legit-
imate while Berg acquiesced to duplicate charges and shoddy 
work. The tactics employed by Defendants and the subcontract-
ors allowed them to obscure the differences between the stan-
dards and requirements of the construction contract (BX. 9) 
and the standards, or lack thereof, in the agreements between 
the contractor and the subcontractors, as previously set forth 
in Point r. Thus, the jury was given the impossible task of 
recognizing and applying at least two different contract 
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standards to the testimony and to the exhibits, and segreg, 
in the mass of detail those charges of the subcontractors: 
were the owners 1 responsibility from those which were the c 
tractor 1 s responsibility, although the exhibits were whol!; 
lacking in the detail necessary to permit the differings~ 
dards to be applied. Had the cases not been consolidat~t 
differing standards would not have been present. 
Permitting the intermingling of the evidence was prej(· 
dicial error, and was the direct result of the conso.idatic 
thus, consolidation was improper, Bascom Launder Corp. v. 1· 
coin Corp., 15 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United Stat~t 
Lustig, supra, particularly in view of the fact that the tr. 
were to a jury and there were different issues and differeJ: 
contracts controlling the legal consequences of the var~w 
cases. Cf. Holbert v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 14 F.R.D. 148(' 
Penn. 1953). 
B. The consolidated trial resulted in confusion. ~· 
end of such a lengthy trial the jury had such a mass of eVl' 
dence before it, some presented early in the trial and invc 
other issues, that it could not reasonably be expected tot: 
it all straight. 
As early as August 19th, the fourth day of the trial, 
the court, after listening to the testimony concerning the 
voluminous change orders submitted by Comstock, and Mr • co: 
stock 1 s acknowledgement that many of them were duplicates, 
stated that although he thought he wasn 1 t going to get con· 
fused, he was "running into a problem." (T. 374}. Mr. com: 
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the author of many of the change orders, also testified that, 
although he had a good memory, he was having trouble keeping 
the various exhibits separate (T. 420) and further stated that 
he was totally confused, and that his ~ind could only handle 
"so many" (T. 424). 
Plaintiffs submit that if a distinguished juror, who had 
the benefit of many years of trial experience and the author 
of many of the documents were both confused, then a jury of 
laymen , without the benefit of notes or of previous instruc-
tions concerning what they were to look for in the evidence, 
must also have been totally and hopelessly lost at that point. 
Plaintiffs submit that this perplexed and uncomprehending con-
dition continued throughout the remainder of the trial and was 
a direct result of the erroneous consolidation and intentional 
tactics of the parties who had fostered the confusion. 
c. Consolidation resulted in the admission of much evi-
dence that should properly have been excluded. Because of the 
consolidation of the cases, there are many instances where the 
evidence was objected to and inadmissible as to the Plaintiffs, 
but properly admissible under the issues among the other par-
ties or in the other cases. Although the court repeatedly 
cautioned the jury respecting that matter (T. 93, 264), Plain-
tiffs submit that such cautioning did not cure the prejudicial 
effects of the admission of the evidence. Examples are the 
testimony on the abortive fraud and misrepresentation claims, 
and testimony impacted by the differing contract standards· 
Hhile there are numerous other examples in the record 
of this occurring, Plaintiffs will detail only two. 
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1. The surety was allowed, over Plaintiffs' 
objections, to present to the jury evidence that the brothe· 
Berg had signed an indemnity agreement with the surety and 
that any judgment that was rendered against the surety wou)( 
be passed through to them. In order to hammer that point 
home, counsel for surety was even allowed to read the indem· 
nity provision to the jury! All this, despite the fact that 
there was no dispute between the surety and the Berg:;,concerr 
ing the validity of the documents or the authenticity of th1 
signatures, and despite the fact that such testimony hadM 
relevance to Plaintiffs' claim against surety. 
This type of testimony was clearly improper and pre: 
dicial to Plaintiffs. It had only one real purpose--~, 
the jury's sympathy. Surety wanted the jury to clearly und1 
stand that if it awarded any money to the owners, payment~ 
come not from company funds but from the "poor" individuals. 
This is the converse of the "insurance policy" argument tha: 
is universally rejected by the courts, i.e., "it's not the 
individual but the 'rich' insurance company that will end u: 
paying the judgment." 
The trial court excluded that evidence with respect 
to Plaintiffs (T. 3184), but it is submitted that such cos~ 
surgery was wholly ineffectual in removing that information 
from the minds of the jury as they weighed the issues. 
2. Although the contractor refused to claim 
that the drywall work was defective, the drywallers, nevert 
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less, presented evidence regarding the quality of the work 
done during the third phase of the suit, i.e., the owners vs. 
the contractor and surety. An objection was timely made to 
that evidence on behalf of the owners which was sustained by 
the trial court (T. 2266, 2269-2270). The evidence was ad-
mitted, however, for the limited purpose of resolving any 
disputes between the drywallers and the contractor relating 
to drywall quality. Between those parties, however, there 
were no such disputes. The contractor and surety both readily 
admitted that the sum requested by the drywaller was due from 
them. Thus, the testimony coming as it did long after the 
drywall phase of the consolidated cases had been concluded, 
without opposition, could only have had one purpose -- to dis-
pute the testimony of the owners' witnesses that the smelly 
apartment and wavy walls failed to meet the contractor's stan-
dard of performance, work "free from faults and defects." 
But as to the owners, that testimony was excluded, and could 
not be considered by the jury for that purpose. The result 
was that the Plaintiffs were again finessed by the consolida-
tion. The record is clear and unchallenged that as between 
the contractor and the owners the drywall did not meet the 
contract standard but the jury heard some evidence that as 
between the contractor and the subcontractor the work was 
acceptable -- a fleeting and transitory distinction shortly 
merged into a general impression. 
Thus, the consolidation placed upon the jury the diff-
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icult and, in Plaintiffs' view, impossible task of segregat 
the testimony applicable to only some of the parties from t 
admissible only as to others. Bascom Launder Corp. v. Tele· 
coin Corp., supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs 5~ 
mit that the jury could not distinguish between those items 
that were admissible for only a limited purpose and those t 
were not, and exclude from their deliberations that evidenci 
that may have been admitted as to one party but not as to 
Plaintiffs. See Hays v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 35 1 
234 (E.D. Penn. 1964). Thus, Plaintiffs' case could not~ 
properly evaluated by the jury; the "excluded" testimony nei 
sarily having permeated their deliberations. 
D. Consolidation created insurmountable practical 
problems. Because of the plethora of issues in the separat1 
cases, Plaintiffs were required to devote a considerable 
amount of time to each of the claims responding in turn to 
all four sets of opposing counsel, both during the trial ani 
in oral argument. Thus, although the court allowed liberal 
time for making closing arguments, etc., the number of issul 
in the combined suits limited the time and diffused the at~ 
tion that Plaintiffs could give to each. 
There can be no doubt that consolidation, with its 
attendant multiplication, confusion and obfuscation of the 
issues, and the inclusion of otherwise inadmissible and int: 
matory accusations against the owners, was the deliberate 
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trial strategy of the surety and the partnership. Prior to 
trial, counsel for surety freely acknowledged that his client, 
the contractor and the subcontractorshad all "banded together" 
against the owners (Supp. T. 15). 
If any doubt exists that the so-called "claims and 
controversies" between the subcontractors and the surety and 
contractor were a charade, one need only review the record of 
this case. Neither surety nor the contractor offered any re-
sistance to the subcontractors' claims. Cross-examination by 
them was minimal or non-existent. No witnesses were called 
by the surety or contractor to rebut the subcontractors' cases 
in chief. No motions were made by surety or the contractor 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the 
subcontractors. As previously pointed out in Point I, both 
the contractor and surety freely admitted that the money was 
due and actually assisted the subcontractors in presenting 
their cases. 
The combination of the parties against Plaintiffs allow-
ed the subcontractors, the partnership and the surety to collab-
orate together and divide up areas of responsibility. It 
allowed four "separate" parties to cross-examine and recross-
examine any witnesses of Plaintiffs, and to remain unanimously, 
approvingly and, to the jury, impressively silent when a wit-
ness of any of them was challenged by Plaintiffs. Thus, much 
of the testimony adverse to Plaintiffs was repeated to the jury 
over and over again, while favorable testimony was effectively 
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buried. Four voices were often raised in support of, or 
against, a particular matter, as opposed to one on the oppc 
side. This numerical disparity, in Plaintiffs' view, encot 
aged the jury to "get on the bandwagon" and had an unfair 
influence on their determinations. 
When the trial concluded, the jury had only the dire 
memory of what had been said earlier and how it impacted th: 
issues of the various cases. In Plaintiffs' view that was: 
significant factor in causing the jury to render its genera. 
verdict, and pick the ultimate figure off the Defendants' e1 
hibits (see Ex. 252), without making the distinctions that 
Plaintiffs have heretofore outlined, without giving Plainti! 
credit for admittedly defective work, and without giving PL 
tiffs' claims the careful consideration to which they ~R 
entitled and which they would have received had the separat: 
suits not been lumped into one mass before the jury. 
E. Consolidation abridged Plaintiffs' substantive 
rights. Plaintiffs were further prejudiced by consolidatk 
because they were precluded, as a result thereof, from rais 
the issue of the lack of contractor's license on the part c 
partnership and the joint venture. The court indicated tha· 
one of the motivating factors in its denial of Plain tiffs' 
Motion for a Summary Judgment on that issue was the fact tr. 
the subcontractors had already presented their claims to~ 
court (T. 1686-1687; R. Cl396). This, however, should ~ft 
and would have had no effect on Plaintiffs' separate claims 
-94-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but for consolidation. Thus, substantive rights of Plaintiffs 
were abridged solely because of the fact that the cases had 
been consolidated for purposes of trial. 
By its own admission, the court did not evaluate Plain-
tiffs' motion wholly upon its merits, but based its decision 
upon the impact a ruling in Plaintiffs' favor would have on 
other portions of the consolidated case that were wholly ex-
traneous to Plaintiffs. 
As mentioned previously in Point VI, the erroneous 
imposition of attorney's fees upon Plaintiffs, which was a 
direct result of the consolidation, also constituted an abridge-
ment of Plaintiffs' substantive rights. 
F. Consolidation caused prejudicial evidence rulings 
and prejudicial and improper Findings to be entered. The 
court, in Plaintiffs' view, committed numerous evidentiary 
errors throughout the course of the trial. This is not to be 
unduly critical of the trial court, but is another evidence 
of the confusion and difficulty occasioned by the consolidation 
of the three cases for purposes of trial. The two most 
egregious such rulings have previously been dealt with in 
Point I, but one additional item requires mention. 
Three months after the rendition of the jury verdict, 
and after the hearing on attorney's fees, the court allowed 
counsel for surety to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. The Findings proposed and adopted went far beyond the 
evidence in the attorney's fee hearing and dealt with issues 
-95-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and facts that were solely within the province of the j~y 
(R. Cl409-1419). Such Findings should be ignored by this 
Court. There is absolutely no indication anywhere that the 
jury, in reaching any of its verdicts, made the Findings 
respecting fault or breach of contract signed by the court, 
Plaintiffs submit that there is no provision under Rule 52, 
U.R.C.P. authorizing the court to speculate concerning the 
rationale of a jury verdict through the entry of the Findinc 
of Fact dealing with issues determinable solely by that bod! 
Such Findings should be set aside by this Court as being im· 
proper under Rule 52. 
The arguments presented in this Point VI either in· 
dividually or in combination show, in Plaintiffs' view, that 
the consolidation resulted in substantial prejudice to Plair. 
tiffs. As such, reversible error was committed. Atkinson 
v. Roth, supra; United States v. Knauer, 149 F. 2d 519 (7th 
Cir. 1945). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the errors com· 
plained of require either a complete reversal of the judgmer 
on the counterclaims of the partnership and the surety or, 
at a minimum, a remand for a new trial without consolidatior 
If this Court concurs that an unlicensed contractor 
may not recover under a construction contract or that one 
member of a joint venture may not recover on the contracts 
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of the joint venture in the absence of a special contract 
and thus avoid an absolute defense which the owner has against 
the joint venture, the judgment should be reversed. At a 
minimum, the award of attorney's fees and interest should be 
promptly vacated. 
If, on the other hand, this court concludes that con-
solidation was prejudicial, or evidentiary rules abused, or 
the trial was unfair or confused, the remedy would be a new 
trial of the issues between the owners, contractor and surety, 
with the prejudice, confusion and unfairness resulting from 
consolidation removed. 
The cumulative effect of the errors complained of 
herein has been to deprive Plaintiffs of their proper day in 
court and of a fair hearing, to facilitate an erroneous and 
unjust verdict compounded by an unlawful addition of enormous 
attorney's fees and interest. Plaintiffs pray this Court to 
rectify that injustice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES 
Earl D. Tanner 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Lignell and Todd 
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,. . 
This Agreement executed the day and year first written above. 
OWNER 
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H. LIGNELL, 
BURTON M. TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD 
-~ ./ By _..-r- • 
- / / ' / 
/ 
CONTRACTOR 
CLIFFORD M. BERG & WILLIAM R. BERG1-
dba BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COOX 
FRANK C. BERG, an individual, A JOI! 
dba BERG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
AlA DOCUMENT A101 • OWNER-CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT • SEPTEMBER 1967 EDITION • AlA® 
©1967 THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS. 1735 N. Y. Avt, N.W .. WASH .. D. C. 20006 
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DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
II- ,;,{ 
This supp~_em~:-.ts that cerc:ain Contract dated 
llovem!:;er 16, 1971 between ::. Keith Lignell, ~iarian H. Li~ell, 
B1Jrton :1. Todd a.TJd E'hyllis W. Todd, the Owner, and Clifford !1. 
Berg and William R. Berg, a partnershi?, dba Be~g Brothers 
Construction, A Joint Venture, dba Be~g_ Co:1struction Company, 
the Cont:::'actor, at Incline Terrace Apat•tments, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
In considerat.i.on of $40i,2ll8. 1JO, the Cor,tractor agrees 
to perform all the worl-: r~quircd by the Con·:ract Docwnentz for 
<'-'1 additional t"went?-twO units CincL1din~ extras) at the Incline 
Terrace ApartTnents. This increases the contract sum from 
$1,351,755.00 to $1,759,003.00. 
The work to ~e performed •.mder thi~:> Contract for t!le 
entire project shall be completed by July 15, 1972. 
C:xr.ibit ~-I 
Witness -~U 
Oate ·-L;~{; ;¢: 
Reporter I? • _.& • 
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OF MARYLAND 
Performance Bond 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: C1it!'ord M. Berg and \Iilli., R. 
Partnership, dba, Berg Brothers ?onstruction Company and Frank 
NOW, THEREFORE. THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION is •uch tha~ i 
~~= :t.JM~~UI~= said contract, then this obligation ohaU be nuU iUid 
The Surety hereby waives notice of any alteration or extension of time made by the Own~r. 
Whenever Contractor shall be. and declared by Owner to be in default under the Contract, 6 
having performed Owner's obligations thereunder, the Surety may promptly remedy the defaalt: 
promptly 
(1) Complete the Contract in accordance with its terms and conditions, or 
(2) Obtain a bid or bids for completing the Contract in accordance with iu temuu 
tions, and upon detennination by Surety of the lowest responsible bidder, or. if the r · 
upon determination by the Owner and Surety jointly of the lowest respons1ble 1 
for a contract between such bidder and Owner, and make available as work 
though there should be a default or a succession ol de£ault!J under the contract or 
arranged under this paragraph) sufficient £unds to pay the coat o( completion 
contract price: but not exceeding, including other costs and damages for which the 
hereunder, the amount set forth in the first paragraph hereoL The term "balance o( 
as uted in this paragraph. shaH mean the total amount payable by Owner to 
Contract and any amendments thereto, leu the amount properly paid by Owner to 
Any suit under this bond must be instituted before the expiration o{ two (2) yean 
whicb final payment under the contract (ails due. 
No right of action shall accrue on this bond to or for the use of any penon or corporatiod'C 
the Owner aamed herein or the beinl, executors. ad.ministratora or succes10ra of Owner. 
Signed and oealed th,u· '---~1,.,6'-'t,_h,_ ____ day ol February 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this { :3ERG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY---
> /6 ;X day oi .:r=-t- 19.z.l ..£ J~ ! P'J!to 
-6.-~-nv ,Zk.LfM=--.Yotary Publu; X p"7F'4 1hZ J~ 
.lfy c ... ....,,,.. "P'"'' 0 '/;_3 FIDELITY AND DEPOSI~ COMPANY OF MAi{Y().I 
2 Yr. ?rem. 19,136.00 
CJOGd-&OM.. 1&161 J 
.\oPI'O"'d bl' n .. AmomC'lln lrutount ol .\n:htu:cu. \./.A. ~nc 
So. A..JII Marth 1969 Edtuon. 
BY----------------~~ 
::!:arl D. Brown 
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I 
OF MARYLAND BIA'-TI MOIItll: 
Labor aod ~aterial Paymeot Hood 
Note: Thll boml ~-'-ted simultaneously ritb Performaace Bond iA favar 
ol theowaer CDDd&Uoaedoa the full and {ajthCW perfonnaac:e of the contract. 
KNOW ALL ME!'/ BY THESE PRESENTS:Cl:i!!ord M. Berg and ''illiam R. Berg, a 
That ~tnersllip, dba, aerg Brothere Coll8trnction Com]l8D1 and Frank c. i!erg, 8ll 
IncfiVICiuar,-a-J'OI:irrv&n~.._. '-' tlMI ~~--· ~llll'al!Jo 4363 Camilli Pml!.,_~§lL~!LCiti. "f~"i!lfD.Z-' Cloa, cerg c;or.striiceion 
u Principal, hereinaCter called Principal, and FmEUTY AND D1rOsrr CoMPANY or 1\olA.an..um a corpo tio 
of the State of Maryland, with its home office in the City of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S. A.,~ Surety,"tr: 
inalter called Surety, are held and 6rmly bouod un~• Keith Lig11ell, f!arian ll. Lig11eU, 
Burton M. Todd and Fhyllia ·.;. Todd, 223 South 7th l:aat, Salt Lake City, utaii84ioz 
u Obligee, hereinafter called ~f:;r""'ih:'~~~':i''cl:Jmants u hereinbelow deUed 
in the amouot of One MillA.Q.!l..~ee !Inn~. Fifty-one Thousand Seven l!undred Fi!t;r-live 
Dollan ($l,35l,755·00 tr";"'th.";~:::t:h'::o~.:ci';u-.':i~ty bind themael-. their hein. 
eucutora, administraton. succea>n and au&l!lll. JOmtly and severally, 6rmly by theoe presento. 
WHEREAS, Principal baa by writteo agreemeot dated tlovember 16, 19..11., 
entered into a contract with Owtau Cor~z,aing work re_~ed b::r Contract Documents for 
Incline Terrace Apartments at 450 South Tenth l:aat, Salt 
in aa:ordance with drawings and opecificetions prepared by.~R=;onal;;'=';'d,_=L3'·;::"c;·o;:l;=•=n _______ _ 
610 !:sst .South Tem'Ol.e, Salt Lake Cit,y'!:.'::U:;ta.h=,_8:.4.:.:l::0::2:..... _______ _ 
CH--..haD--.~..d--..w.-
which contract is by reference made a part hereof. and ;. hereinafter referred to u the Cootract. 
NOW, THEREFORE. THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION io ouch that, if PriDcipal ohall 
promptly make payment to all claimants ao hereinaftOI' defined, lor all labor and material uiiOII or ..-n. 
ably required for u.e in the perfonnance of the Contract, then thio obligation ahall be void; otherwile it ahall 
rmWn 10 full force and effect. subject. however, to the following conditiona: 
1. A claimant La defined as one having a direct contract with the Principal or with a •ub-coatn.ctor of 
the Principal lor labor, material, or both, used or reasonably required for 1110 in the performance of the 
contract. labor and material being construed to include that part of water, gao, powOI', light, heat, oil, 
paoline. telephone service or rental of equipment directly applicable to the Contract. 
Z. The above named Princil:! and Surety hereby jointly and severally agree with the Owne!' that every 
~ter'ili! :~::n:bi~~e"~t of ,':;'J, ~,:~~·~n~~kb:obbo~ .;:."~':~~ .. ~~~~~~~~ ~.,Y! 
furnished by such clai.ma.at, may sue on this bond for the uae of such claimant. protecUte the suit to 6Dal 
judgment for l!IUcb sum or sums u may be justly due claimant, and have execution thereon.. The Owner abaU 
not be liable for the payment o£ any oosts or expeDRS of any such suit. 
3, No suit or action ohaiJ be commeoced hereunder by any claimant: 
(a) Unl- claimant, other than one hevin~ a direct contract with the Principal, ohall he"" ~­
written notice to any two of the following: The Principal, the Owner, or the Surety above named. 1nthin 
ninety (90) days alter ouch claimant did or perfonned thelutol the work or labor, orlumiahed the Jut 
of the materials for which oaid claim ;. made, otating with substantial accuracy the amouot claimed and 
the name o£ the party to whom the materials were furnished, or for whom the work or labor wu done or 
performed. Such notice ohaiJ be oerv<d by mailing the same by registered mail or certified mail, ~
prepaid, in aa eJlvelope addreooed to the Principal, Owner or Surety, at any pla<:e where an oflice ,. 
regularly maintained for the transaction of buoineoo, or served in any maaner in which legal -
may be oened in the state in which the aforesaid project io located, ave that such oervice need not be 
mad(b'}" .\rl';b:/.~ :.~tion of one (I) year foUowing the date on "hich PriDcipal ceuecl wor!< ~n aid 
Contract, it being undentood, ho"""""· that if any timitatioa embodied in this bond io pn>hib1ted by 
any law CODtrolliag the co .. truction berea! ouch limitation ahall be deemed to be amended oo u to be 
equal to the minimum period of limitatioo permitted by ouch law. . . 
(c) Other than in a otate court of oompetent juriodiction \D "!'d for the c;ountyorother poli~ oub-
division of the state in which the project, or any part thereof, 1111tuated, or"' the Umted Stateo D-
Court for the district in which the project, or any part thereof, ~amtuated. and not e!oewhere. .... ~-. 
4 The amouot of this bond shell be reduced by and to the extent of any payment or peymeatl """"' ll1 
cooc1 Wth hereuoder, incluoive of the payment by Surety of mechania' tiens wbich may be filed of record 
ageinot oaid improvement, whether or not claim for the amount of such lien be praeated under and_.... 
this bond. F b 72 
Signed and oeeled thio 16th day of • ruar:r A.D. 19-
Subocrib<d and swam to before me thi• { 3ERG CONSTRUCTION COMPA.'I! (SJW.) 
/;,:; ~ dayof -75'.:.:, 192:.2 L A"""tol 
J--_,o7i -Z:-:cifiy&'y, ,Notary Pub& X tt?flin/?n .. C?,s-6. ~ 
JL, c--. ..,.,u, 0/ )..I 1, 3 1r -fiiii' YLAND 
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MAR 
/ 
By . 
Earl D. Brown Prem. included ill Performance Bond 
-/ 
Tilll 
Attorne:r-111-Fact 
(S..U.) 
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~ L ' j ' 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
CLIFFORD M. BERG, being duly sworn upon his oath, do: 
says that: 
1. He is a partner in Berg Brothers Construction Compt 
"IDember of that certain joint venture doing business as Berg Con~· 
Company. 
2. He is authorized to execute documents on behaU o! Be: 
tion Company which are binding upon the said joint venture, all~ 
therein and all members thereof. 
3. The project known as the Incline Terrace Apartments. 
and t:!:J.ere are to your affiant's knowledge no liens or claims whit: 
result in liens on the said project, except: 
Dated 
a. Toy Hansen Plumbing 
b. Bateman Electric 
c. Western Sheet Metal 
d. S & H Painting 
e. Western Drywall & Claron Bailey 
f. Western International Industries dbR 
Lady Fair Kitchens, Time Commercial 
Financing Corporation, Pioneer Wholesale 
Supply Company. Intermountain Lumber Cooc 
g. Standard Builders Supply 
h. Dahn Brothers. Inc. 
i. Elias Morris & Sons Go. 
j. John H. Gerstner, Jr. 
k. Superior Insulation 
1. Olympus Glass Go. 
this J,q;.f day of February, 1974. 
tQinl !Jl }.j 
CLIFF RD M. BERG 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /~day of Febr.: 
I ~y Gommi•sion Expires: 
ll _ __q~_-?.? ""'-''i • ...:._.,- _ _ 
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1 
2 
:s 
; DEFENDANTS 
{ EXHIBIT 
: /{,~-o<. 
l 
SUBORDINATION OF LIEN RIGHT 
Baaed 11pon the m11tual consideration exchanged· between the below 
4 mentioned parties, Clliford Berg and William Berg dba Berg Brothers 
5 Conatruction, a partnership and Frank Berg, an individual, a J'oiDt Venture 
6 dba Berg Construction Company hereby aubordiDate any and aU lima or claima 
7 
which may result in liena OD the below deacribed premioes to the righta, title 
a 
9 
and interests of the Travelers Insurance Company, a CODDecticut corporation, 
on the subject premise• arioing pursuant to that certain Deed of Trust datld 
10 
ll March 28, 1973, executed by E. Keith Lignell and Marian H. Lignell, hia wUe, 
l2 and B11rton M. Todd and Phyllia W. Todd, hia wife, aa Truatora, in the aum of 
1:S $1, 700. 000. 00, to Title IDaarance Agency of Utah, IDe., aa Truatee in favor of 
14 the Travelera IDaurance Company, a Connecticut corporation, aa Beneficiary 
15 and alao to the righta, title and inter uta of Ziona Firat National Bank on the 
16 
subject premiaea arising p11rauant to that certain Deed of Truot dated January 
17 
l6 
29, 1974, by E. Keith Lignell and Marian H. Lignell, hia wife, ud BurtDn M. 
Todd and Phyllis W. Todd, hia wife, aa Truatoro, in the aam of $Z67, 000. 00 19 
20 to Ziona Firat National Bank, aa Truatee, and in favDr of Ziona Firot National 
21 Bank, aa Baeficiary. 
22 The premiaea to which the subordination agreement appliea are lmowa 
23 aa the IDcliDe Terrace Apartmenta, more particularly described aa follclwa: 
24 
25 
26 
27 
26 
29 
30
1
. 
31 
:S2 
l.) Com 132ft S fr NW cor LotS, Bll< ZO, Plat F, 
SLC Sur. S 37 ft E 82. S ft N 39"6' E 48. 18 ft N 30" 
Z2'20" E 56.19 ft W 30U9 ft S 39"6' W tD point d11e 
E £r beg W to beg. 2.) Com S rds S fr NW cor Lot 
5, Bll< ZO, Plat F, SLC a11r. S 39.5 ft E 8Z.26 ft N 
39"6' E to a point d11e E of beg W 110.97 ft to beg. 
3,) Com Z-1/2 rd S of NW cor LDt S, Bll< ZO, Plat 
F, SLC S11r. S Z-l/2 rd E S rd N Z-1/2 rd W 5 rd to 
_&'bgu described on Exhibit "A" attac:bad lleNto. 
Dated thia 1at day of February, 1974. 
Cliliord Berg lc William Berg dba Berg 
Brothers Construction, a partnership and 
Frank Berg, an individual, a Joint Vencv.re 
db& Berg Conatr11ction Company · 
By "ZA..~~ ~ 
Byo~.£~ 
• 
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~ 
Bi:GINNING at a point 33 feet North of the Southwest corner of Lot 0 U 
Plat ~F" Salt take City Surwy and running thence llorth 0°00'46" we;u 
feet, thence llorth 89°57'5~" East 82.50 feet; thence South 0°00'o6" l'<lt 
feet:, thence llorth 8g 0 S7' 5~" East 65.25 feet 1 thence llorth 0°00'o6" Welt 
feet, thence llorth 89°57'54" East 242,25 feet, thence South O•OO'o6' t.~ 
feet, thence South 89°57' 54" West 36,0l feet, thence South 0°00 1o6" U.t 
feet, thence South 89°57 • 54" West 353.99 feet, to the point of be!linnir4, 
TOGi:n!ER Win! a right-of-way over a l2 foot alley described as follows: 
Cot::mancing 7 l/3 feet West of the Northeast cornar of Lot 4, Block 20 1 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence South l2 feet; thence taat l1 
faet; to ll th East Street; thence North l2 feat; thence West 337 l/3 f~ 
place of beginning. 
txCtl:'TING n!EREFROM: 
BEGiliNING at a point 33 .feet llorth and l58 feet East from the Southwest 
of !At ~. Block 20, Plat "F'', Salt Lake City Survey, running thenceliorl 
feet, thence East 6 feet, thence South l2 feet, thence East l27 l/3 fo~ 
South l20 feat,. thence West l33 l/3 feat to the point of beginning, 
~ A Leasehold Estate In: 
Bi:GINNING at a point 33 feet North and l58 feet East from the Southwest 
of Lot 4, Block 20, Plat "F'', Salt Lake City Survey, running thenceior. 
feet, thence East 6 feat, thence South l2 feet, thence East l27 l/3 feot. 
South 120 feat, thence West l33 l/3 feet to the point of beginning. 
All as reflected in that certain lease agreement dated April lS, 1971,: 
between Wayne N. Mason and Pearl B. Mason, his wife, Lessors, and&.~ 
Lignell and Marian H. Lignell, his wife; and Burton M. '!'odd and Phyllil 
his wife, Lessees, and such lease being recorded as Entry No. 2o021!8, 
Lease and Option to Purchase was recorded April lO, l973, as Entry No, 
in ilook 3298, l)a~te 399, records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
TOGEnlE:R Win!, and wi:thout limitation of any kind, all iq>rove1110nts ol 
. :'7 na=e construCted or locate4 on said describe4 property; aDI1 togethlr 
v'-1' 4_ &fter-ac,.uireci title to tbe land describe4 in Parcel B. 
tiV 6:.. 
~17J;fr 
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)!IX*' 'fi 'I4¥1JXCorroon and Blac.k . 
Name of Agent... ______________ ·---------~ 
APPLICATION FOR CONTRAcr OR BID BOND MADJ1 TO TBB I ,-, .:-
~ .;'f c 
Fidelity and Deposit Company 
HOME OFFICE 01' MARYLAND IMLTIMOIIE, MD. >120J 
4. Kinds and amounts of bonds required; Propooal Boad, •-------1 Coatnet Boad, t.J..35l, 755. 
Labor aad Material Boad, .~51, 755~----: Maiatea....,. Boad, •-------
5. To whom is bond to be given?.~~-~ith .H&'!!!.!.J_, ___ M.!_r__!!!!!_~ignell._~~ M. Todd and 
cGi,.hall-•..wr-.u .. ~_.._.tilW Addres&----------------~!_1_~~· W, Todd 
6. If bond applied for is Proposal Bond, will it operate u a linal bond? .State date bido to be opened 
----------- , 19 __ Approximate amount of bid, 1----------
What bids for other contracts have you outstanding?·---·--·---------------
------------------------------
7. The amount of Contract is: , __ 1,.,1?1, 755 ~---·---------_J)•te awarded .. _________ _ 
(U coauact price ill pn- vdt ol ~. ~~~ &.t.11f01aal* toW ol W~Hnetl 
8. Nature of Contract (Give concise description of proposed work and loc::aJ.ity) ... 
-----------~~~ all_~~.!.lt __ :;:~red ~the Contract Do~~~=-~~------------· 
____ _]:.!!_cline Ten.'!.!'_'!..!l!!.~~~~•--450 ~_l_Oth -~~st,_Y.~~:__.!:_~ City, __!1~-
9. Name and address of Architect or Engineer in charge .... -~,__K<!!!'.!!_ _________________________ _ 
1 \Vhat is his estimate of cost of work? S--·-·------Your estimate?'---··---------t 10. Other Bidden on above contract including bigheot and lowat; 
.! ADDIUISS I >IA>UI ! BID 
i ! ~ __________ _j __ _ 
- If more than five bids, tabulate them on separate paper and attach to above r 
-9 TERMS OF CONTRACT 
7 11. Date work is to be commenced.--.. --·-·--·--· .Date work is to be comple•teO'--------i 12. Penalty for non.-completion on time._, _____ .. _· ____ .Premium for advance completioa. ... -----
13- Is there a strike claUH: in the contract?... _____ _..An arbitratioa provision?. ____ .. _____ _ 
14. Payments, when to be made on contract?.-·----------------
15. Amount of advance payment, if any S------
C360o-toM. 111fJ6 
SU.clvd Fcnw 
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or corrections, when 10 m<lde, shall be prima fa.cit coi'Tttt; Fouus, ~at the Company i!l authorized and empowered, without notice to ar knowl· 
~ge of _the undentgned, t? ~uent to any change "':'~ats?ever In satd bo.nd or bond• and/or any contracts referred to in said bond or bonds 
and/or 1n the 1enerat cond1t1ons, plana and/or speotlcanons o1:ccompanyu:,:~g aa~d contracts and. to a.ue.nt to or ta.ke any aaaignment or a.saign. 
menrs, t? execute or consent to the execut:~on of any conunuauons, extenstons or. renewal!! of satd bond or bonds and to execute any substitute 
:;::f~t~t:d~~=r~~~t:~ sa;.~ ot~h~i~~d~;~~~i~~;,~·.re~:~o~u~dd uo:J~~~:~~1th0ft~~A~~~~~re::~~~~~ra~a~ti1~~~ta=~~ 
by ~e Company does or mtght substanually tncrease the llabthty of the unders1gned; and the undersigned agree to waive, and do i-lereby waive, 
nouce of any breach or breaches of any such bof!-d or bonds, or of any act or deiault that may give nse to claim hereunder; FtnH, to aslltn. 
transfer and set OVe", and does or do hereby asstgn, tran,fer and set over to the Company, as collateral, to !lecu~ the obliptions herein and 
!ff~f~:' a!"!e~h~d:: ~{~~~~~~~c0tf ~~dub~~~1n t~~et ~f{t)anri'y =~:O~~n~e;~~~~~~:~u~:~~~~~~~i;~~~~~~~~~~~0y ~~h 
of sa1d bond or bonc:fs. or any of lhe.JI?. or of any other bond or bon_ds executed or procured by the ~om1?'U-y on bdlali. of the undentgned: or 
(2) ~! ~ny breach ol the agreements !n any of the paragrap~s herem con tamed; or (3) of a default m dtscharg'ing such other indebtedness or 
ltabtht.tes when due; or (4) of any assJrnment by the understgned for the benefit of ~itors, or of the apP?intment, or of any application for 
~~~~~"~C::;·;~ ~~~~:,~~~~P:~~·eP't:~~!l:c!~ ;=t~~li~d=t ~':i:O~e0ro\f~_:fn~n~~.::;t;"~r(~)~f ~~"u"nd~~~~~~:i~e:, 
r:t:~:gth~d:s~~!i~tl::i~~d~~~~~~~fe~o':.V::~ 1~~ in ~~~~n~~~o~h~~b~d~~~~t:n~nr~~~di~ ~il ~u::~h:q~:~~:~~ 
~;,; ~\"S:~=~~e;~~~ i:: :r0~:!tfeht~e:~ ==\:bi~~~b!i: = woct~':::~':i~~~:~~c!~~~!,~in1~u,!: 
portation to said site; (b) All the rights of the undenigned in, and growinr in any manner out of, said contract, or any extensioru.. modiitca.tiona, 
changes or alterations thereof, or additions tb!:r"eto, or in, or gTOWlng in any manner out o{, said bond or bonds, or any of them; (c) All actions, 
causes of actions, claims and demand• whatsoever which the undl!nigned may have or acquW against any aubcontraetor, laborer or material 
man, or any person furnishing or agreeing to fumiah or aupply labor, material, su~lies, machinery, tools or other equipment in connection with 
~:t~~~~t :t! :!dti:~di~d~~d~!!:!~ ~::-'o~~~.o:. a=~~ereait! =~~~ d~:: s~~~ ~t~~~ili~~!:u~d~u:::n 
e..tend to, and include, the fuJI amount of any and aU 5UlDa paid by the Company in settlement or compromise of any cLaima, demand.a, suiu 
and judgmenu upon aid bond or honda, or any ot' them, on rood faith, under the belief that it was liable therefor, whethl!'!' liable or not, u 
well as of any and all disbursements on aa:owlt of coats, ttpe:nM:B and attorneya' fees, u aforeaid, which may be made under the beliel that 
auc:h were neceasary, whether nec:aaary or not: SEVENTH, that in ew:nt of payment, settJement or c:ompromiR, in iood faith, of liability, Ia., 
=:s~:C:a!rtb:ZC::.~t~:"~ C:!en;:h;;~:n-: ~~en,:~~~:,~t~ ~~~u:a~~~,:j'!!o~ 
dence of the fact and extent of the liability of the undersigned., in an& elaim or IUit hereunder, and in a.ny and aU matten ari1tor between the 
?r!C:Ui:~~~~~.~~:nciJ,~?;t ;oc':!v:;.::.d4:t:-~o!~tit::~~~~~~. ~~ ~U x:f~~ ~~I.d:~~ho~':!~~ :dex= 
:::ti~. f~ ~: =~t~rn;e'Co~:~ !:dbo~d ~:U=:l.;~Y~tht~~:UY 0: ae:;~~;a~do~~~;~!~i!i ~~::.!~~ 
thereupon: TENTH, that separate suits may be brourht hereunder as causes of action acaue, and the bnnging of suit or the recovery of judgment 
upon any ca.u&e of acticn shall not ~judice.or bar the bringi.ng of other auit:s upon o~er ca.11,ses of ac;io~ •. wbether. theretofo~ or the;reafter 
arising; ELEVENTH, that nothing here1n contatned shall be con11der~ or construed to 'Willve, abndge, or d~1niah any. nght or remedy.wb:~ch the 
Company might have if this inatrument were not e:x.ecuted; TWEI.FTB. that the Company 1hall have the nght to decline to execute sa.ad bond or 
::~~ho; t~nJ~fi!~~·~~~tn~ ~~~~~er~~: ~t!~dr:r~~i=~na~n~:tT:~:i~~Ya~~a~=~:~.;';b:' !~~:'J:n~=~= 
for which the bid or proposal bond ts giVen; TatRT!:,ENTB, ~hat t~1~ agreement shall be btndlnl{ upon the un~entgf!-ed and each of th~. whether 
signiog as applicant for said bond or bonds or u tndemnltor, JOintlY and severally and upon the respecuve bell1, executon, admiaistratora, 
successor~~ and aasigns of the undersigned, aJld shall be liberally eonsuued aa aplnst the undenitned. 
thio'----=-='--~,_ .. day or.__ Nov_ember , 19.21_ 
If INDMDU.U. siru here:_ ~(·1'~-~~i~(.,_ . ..L_/..,U.1/~9---'5Jw.) Fra~c.Bf:rg 
f Co-P.u.TnURIP sign hen!: 
BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (Siw.) 
_-.;:r-...:·;._:..·· o,_;d::J.f!:;. . .=Ic;,/.J... ,...,.1';-l..,.."-...-;-/.;;8...:··-<'o:,. -"'C:SP"~,l--..---CSUL) 
· r (lDdividuaJ.Iy and u a eo-~er) 
-----,(,-ln-;cii,-,vid,-,. -uall-:;y-an"'d_u_a_co-=putn=::c.,.-.) ___ (SUI.) 
-----;;(l~nd"';.,"·d·;-ua-;,ll::-y-and70u.,-:a,-co-=-=oonn=..-:o):----(SIW.) 
(Name of corporacioa) 
Attest'--------------;5;;;,..:;_,:;:;;;;--
By Pr~ 
ADDmONAL INDEMNITY 
'deration of the FmELITY ..uro DEPOSIT COMPANY oF MA.JtYUND executing, or P.rocuring th~ a:ecution of the ~!ld or bo_ad1 ~eteia 
apptf:d ~we jointly and RVer.~IIY join in th'= f~oing agreement; and ~e undeni~. if a corporanog, warn.n~ ~t.tt 1~6na~te; esa:d in tb~ performaoce of the obligation which said bOnd or bondll applied foe" are ~r~ven to aecure, an a.neru t t It lS Y em 
obfipSigae<!~~· ;uelf benob:d dated~~ 24th / day ol November , 19-,71.. ' 
_ -;_/~;', "I . ~ J :i~ (S!W.) 
-- · -- ,.,.;.) ~ ~<&t~~ce'i!.'.f~emnito<) ' tf 
------,===------'(S!W.) 
----...J,!'-----;;cw;iii,,_) (Indemnitor) 
(Witneu) 
------,;1~-;_---,-) ______ (Siw.) 
Mu.t be ackuowledpd before Notary Public by ladeamltor(•)· 
STATE OP Utah 
CoVlfTT OW- Salt I.ake 
On~g, ___ £24~th~------------- _day ot ______ JlQY.!1;mb~te.,.r.._ ___ 19..1l-. bel.,. me ,......n,. appooreli 
Beatr1c~L_R~~r_g_ . . · insaumeat a.ad w-;;·known·-,.~be---,-th_e_peno--'""n(s) ~r member(•) of the part.Denhip or offieer(s) of the corporation that ,ll(Ded the fOfeiOllll 
lldmowiedged the ezecutton o£ the ume to rne. _ ·"' _ / 
(· Notary Public - My Commiaion Expira.__---'-------
U lademni.tor g a eol'pONtJoa.. a a.rt.Uied copy of nao.lutkm of Baud of DU.ton 
au~ of&een to ezeeate apea~~U~Dt mu.t acaompal7 t.bl.- aJ'PIIe-doD. 
, " 
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